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Abstract
To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we
refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach
of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank
potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties’ taxpayer num-
bers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in
that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in
a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experi-
ment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads.
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1 Introduction
Many countries’ civil courts experience long delay and large case backlog (e.g., Agor et al. 2015;
Palumbo et al. 2013). The time and resources it takes to enforce contracts may discourage
investment into profitable business and impede economic prosperity. Slower courts and larger
case backlog have been linked to more breaches of contract and less investment (Chemin
2012), less lending and tighter credit constraints (Jappelli et al. 2005), higher firm financing
costs and smaller firms (Fabbri 2010). So, what reforms can help speed up the courts?
Among other things, some have suggested that fewer cases for the courts to look at can
help reduce the time it takes to resolve civil disputes (see, e.g., Palumbo et al. 2013). To
this end, we propose a procedural rule that aims at reducing the number of court case filings
associated with a category of contracts of particularly low profile. The implied reduction in the
overall caseload should speed up the courts. As the empirical evidence suggests, faster courts
in turn are likely to encourage more investment into profitable business of higher profile—
business that is more economically significant and legally complex—leading to more lending,
more investment, and more firm growth.
To reduce the caseload, we focus on low-profile cases for breach of contract with a sure
outcome in court, which make up the bulk of the caseload at civil courts. For example, in some
U.S. state courts in 2012–13, almost two-thirds of all non-domestic civil cases were contract
disputes; when recorded, damage awards in those disputes averaged at less than $10,000.1
These cases mostly consist of debt collections, landlord-tenant disputes, and foreclosures.2
They are brought to secure a sure ruling, which then allows the claimant to initiate the legal
enforcement of a payment (see Agor et al. 2015, p. 35).
With this focus, we suggest to induce unraveling effects of the kind that have been de-
scribed to be at work in many contexts in law and economics (e.g., Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar
2009; Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest 2010). Specifically, we propose to preorder the service
of such low-profile contract cases at the courts, replacing sequential service, which processes
them in order of arrival. If nobody wants to be first in line at the courts, then unraveling
reduces the number of such low-profile contract cases being filed. As a consequence, more
resources can be allocated to the speedier resolution of higher-profile disputes. The reliance
of preordered service on unraveling may undermine its performance in practice (e.g., Nagel
1995; McKelvey and Palfrey 1992). Could it have an effect? We provide proof of concept in
the context of a population of low-profile contracts, in theory and in an experiment.
1According to Agor et al. (2015), 64% of all (925,344—about 5% of U.S. state civil cases) non-domestic civil
cases disposed between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013 in 152 courts in 10 urban counties were contract cases.
Despite fluctuations, this share tends to be above 50% over time (p. 36). The mean of recorded damage awards
was $9,428; award values at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles were $1,251, $2,272, and $4,981, respectively.
2Agor et al. (2015) report that debt collections, landlord-tenant disputes, and foreclosures make up 37%,
29%, and 17% of the contract cases in their dataset, respectively.
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For the sake of exposition, suppose that all contracts are low-profile and have a sure
outcome in court if breached. Suppose further that every entity can be party to at most
one contract so that every contract can be uniquely identified using any of the parties to it.
Preordered service then requires the judiciary to list all entities that may enter contracts in
some order, using some uniquely identifying information, like taxpayer numbers. It makes
publicly known that it will serve court cases for breach of contract filed within an ex ante
specified period of time in the order of that list, using the listed entities to identify contracts
and thus cases. Courts then collect all cases filed during the specified time period. At the end
of it, they order the collected cases according to the list and serve the first ones in line first.3
We present preordered service of such low-profile contract cases at the courts in a stylized
economy. We interpret this economy as an extreme version of a richer environment with two
features that preordered service uses. First, every contract can be associated with a uniquely
identifying label. Second, the prospect of a potential court case being served first, rather than
somewhere down the line, tips agents over from breaching the contract to honoring it.
Our stylized economy consists of many investors and many entrepreneurs. While en-
trepreneurs have productive projects, investors are endowed with the capital required to im-
plement them. Investors and entrepreneurs are randomly matched with one another and can
enter a contract to use the investor’s capital in the entrepreneur’s project. After production,
however, the entrepreneur can breach the contract and keep all the output, in which case a
claim is filed with the court. For simplicity, we assume that the court can serve exactly one
claim, in which case the respective breaching party incurs a cost; all other claims go unen-
forced. This simplification is an extreme version of costs and gains to the respective parties
to a breached contract that are associated with long court delays.
In this environment, we represent sequential service by a random draw of one breached
contract for service. This assumption captures the idea that civil cases queue randomly when
filed, and only the first in line is served. Modeled in this way, sequential service can lead to
inefficiencies: some investors do not invest because all contracts are breached, but not all are
enforced. In contrast, we model preordered service using an ad hoc label to represent some
uniquely identifying information relating to the contract or the parties to it. This way we
capture the idea that, to do its job the best it can, the judiciary could in principle make use of
the identities of the parties to a dispute. The ranking of potential contracts by these labels is
announced before they are signed. The judiciary then serves the highest-ranked contract that
is breached. In this environment, preordered service achieves efficiency. The intuition is that
no entrepreneur wants to be associated with the highest-ranked contract that is breached.
Thus, in equilibrium, no entrepreneur breaches the contract and all investors safely enter
contracts with entrepreneurs, which maximizes aggregate production and consumption.
3In Section 5 we explain, among other things, how preordered service deals with many contracts per entity.
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This theoretical success of preordered service builds on iterated elimination of dominated
strategies and backward induction. Experimental evidence suggests that this fact may under-
mine its effectiveness in practice (e.g., Nagel 1995, McKelvey and Palfrey 1992, respectively),
which we cannot examine in the field as preordered service is counterfactual. Therefore, we
test its performance in a laboratory experiment. We implement our environment and under-
take ceteris paribus comparisons of individual and aggregate behavior with preordered and
sequential service. We find that, over the course of the experiment, the court caseload is more
than 40 percent lower with preordered service than it is with sequential service. In the last
round of the experiment, preordered service results in half as many court cases as sequential
service. While investment levels do not differ across both rules, with preordered service, as
fewer contracts are breached, investors on average secure a higher payoff.
We discuss related literature in Section 2 and present our stylized environment and its
predictions in Section 3. In Section 4, we report our experimental design, hypotheses, and
empirical findings. Departing from the simplified exposition we adopt for most of the paper,
we discuss how preordered service could be taken to practice in Section 5. We conclude in
Section 6.
2 Relation to the Literature
We focus on a large inflow of civil cases as one source of court delay and case backlog in the
judicial system. Our procedural rule, preordered service, reduces the case inflow and thus the
workload facing the judiciary. A related source of delay and backlog is the case flow time—the
time it takes to conclude a case. Building on insights of Coviello et al. (2014, 2015) into task
juggling, Bray et al. (2016) take an operations management perspective to reduce case flow
times in a field experiment in an Italian court. They focus on scheduling the sequence of
hearings a case requires, when many cases are in progress at the same time, taking the inflow
of cases as given. By contrast, our focus is on scheduling initial hearings—i.e., the order in
which cases are opened—to affect the inflow of cases, taking case flow times as given.
We model contractual relationships with an option to breach similar to the underlying
game in Bohnet et al. (2001), who modify the original investment game introduced by Berg
et al. (1995). We use a population of such investment relationships and think of it as a
stylized economy with aggregate output. When service is sequential, the probability of any
one breached contract to be enforced—i.e., to arrive first in line—is endogenous. Of course,
the patterns of economic interactions are more complex than we model them. Basu et al.
(2009) let many investors and many entrepreneurs have multiple investment relationships
at the same time to study record keeping and trust. Preordered service can incorporate
multiple investment relationships in a straightforward fashion. For example, contracts can be
ranked lexicographically, where the first and second coordinates of the label are the respective
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taxpayer numbers of the associated investor and entrepreneur. This approach also works with
financial intermediaries.
Our focus is on low-profile civil cases for breach of contract for which there is no uncer-
tainty about the outcome in court. However, preordered service could potentially be adopted
whenever accurate reports of violations can be generated at low enough costs. In terms of
Mookherjee and Png (1992)’s analysis of costly monitoring versus investigation of violations
of law or regulation, we focus on the investigation of violations, which in our setup are re-
ported with probability one. Since reports are accurate and investigation costs are low in our
environment, Mookherjee and Png (1992) would in fact suggest to use only investigation. In
their terminology, we describe and compare preordered and sequential investigation.
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2009) and Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2010) study similar
strategic interactions. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2009) use an argument based on unraveling
to explain the prevalence of plea bargains in simultaneous criminal proceedings that involve
a resource-constrained prosecutor handling many cases. The threat by a resource-constrained
prosecutor to take to court all those who do not accept the plea offer should not be credible.
However, common knowledge of the priorities according to which the prosecutor selects who
to prosecute among those who reject the plea offer gives rise to a similar unraveling as in
our case, so that all plea offers are accepted in equilibrium. More generally, studying a
multiplication effect inherent to the thread of punishment but not to the promise of reward,
Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2010) show that a similar unraveling argument allows a principal
to enforce compliance of many agents in a setting with monitoring. They use their insights
to explain a number of observations in law and economics. The nature of our contribution
is quite different. Rather than using an unraveling argument to explain an observation,
we are proposing a hitherto untested procedural rule based on a similar logic to address
delay and backlog at civil courts. While preordered service builds on similar unraveling
arguments, our environment focuses on enforcing low-profile contracts, which largely elude
monitoring and make up the bulk of civil court caseloads. Assuming that claims are filed
when a contract is breached, we show that preordered service has bite across a population of
otherwise strategically independent contracting games, both in theory and in the lab.
Finally, in the literature on public goods games, Andreoni and Gee (2012, 2015) and
Kamijo et al. (2014) study centralized punishment institutions to sanction non-cooperative
behavior that induce a similar strategic interaction. The institutions in these papers punish
the least cooperative player. Thus, in equilibrium, all players contribute just enough to the
public good in order not to be the least cooperative player. In such strategic games with
small self-governing groups, the authors argue, this sort of centralized punishment institution
comes quite naturally. However, it requires information about the contributions of all players
in order to rank them and calculate the fines. By contrast, while preordered service might
not come quite as naturally—and to some may even appear unfair at first—it requires only
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little information: it relies solely on a report being filed if and when an individual or an entity
has violated a convention, a law, a regulation, or a contract. A notification that a violation
occurred is enough. In principle, while it can be used, the degree of the violation is irrelevant.
Hence, as preordered service can make use of existing uniquely identifying information, like
taxpayer numbers, the additional administrative costs of introducing it are likely manageable.
3 The Model and Predictions
In this section, we discuss a stylized environment with many contracts in which (i) every
contract is associated with a uniquely identifying label, and (ii) the prospect of a potential
court case being served first, rather than somewhere down the line, tips agents over from
breaching the contract to honoring it. We describe the environment in Section 3.1, present its
predictions in Sections 3.2–3.4, and provide a discussion of our assumptions, interpretations,
and predictions as well as an extension in Section 3.5. All proofs are in Appendix A.
3.1 The Environment
There are 2n risk neutral agents, n investors and n entrepreneurs. Investors are endowed with
one unit of productive capital each that they can either rent out or convert into one unit of
the consumption good. Entrepreneurs are endowed with one unit of time each that they can
allocate indivisibly to one of two uses. They can either produce one unit of the consumption
good or implement a project that requires one unit of capital. The project is risk-free and
converts one unit of capital into 2w units of the consumption good, where n > w ≥ 2.
Investors and entrepreneurs are randomly paired. Before any interaction, the n pairs are
assigned distinct labels z1, z2, . . . , zn. These labels could be associated with only one party
to the pair, like one of their taxpayer numbers. All agents know the label of their pair.
The investor in a pair moves first and decides whether or not to enter a contract with the
entrepreneur in that pair. All investors move simultaneously. If the investor in a pair declines,
then both parties separately produce one unit of the consumption good, implying payoff 1
for both the investor and the entrepreneur. If the investor enters the contract, then the
entrepreneur implements the project and produces 2w units of the consumption good. The
terms of the contract are fixed exogenously to sharing the project’s output equally.
Then, all entrepreneurs move simultaneously and decide whether or not to honor the
contract, if they have one. An entrepreneur can breach the contract by keeping all the output.
In this case, a claim is filed with the judiciary. The order of arrival of these claims at the
court is random. The judiciary then selects exactly one such claim for enforcement according
to one of two possible procedural rules: either (i) sequential service or (ii) preordered service.
If service is sequential, then the first claim in line for enforcement is served. That is, as
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the order of arrival is random, one claim is randomly selected for enforcement, with equal
probability for each claim. Letting x ≥ 0 be the number of all claims filed with the judiciary,
if x ≥ 1, then the probability of any individual claim to be enforced is p = 1/x.4
If service is preordered, then at the outset, the judiciary generates and announces an or-
dered list of the labels z1, z2, . . . , zn. Every claim is associated with a breached contract, the
parties to which belong to a pair identified by one such label. The judiciary then uses the or-
dered list of labels to order the claims and enforces the first claim in line. The ordered list is a
finite sequence generated by some bijection f : {1, 2, . . . ,n} → {z1, z2, . . . , zn} associating po-
sitions 1, 2, . . . ,n in the line at the court with the pairs via their labels z1, z2, . . . , zn. Without
loss of generality, we assume that f(i) = zi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. We can therefore repre-
sent the ordered list by the n-tuple (z1, z2, . . . , zn), and the label index i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . ,n}
directly indicates pair zi’s position in the line.
If a claim is selected for enforcement, then it is enforced with certainty. In this case, the
pair’s investor is made whole by a payment w from the pair’s entrepreneur, who in addition
incurs a cost c ∈ (0,w). This cost makes breach of contract costly upon enforcement and can
be interpreted as capturing many kinds of costs, like, e.g., attorney fees or reputation costs.
Therefore, while the entrepreneur’s payoff from honoring the contract if they have one is w,
their expected payoff from not honoring it is
p(w− c) + (1− p)2w = 2w− p(w+ c),
where p is the probability of the contract being enforced, which is determined by the procedural
rule in interaction with the breach decisions of entrepreneurs who have a contract. The
investor’s payoff from entering the contract is w if it is honored. Conditional on the contract
not being honored, the investor’s expected payoff from entering it is
pw+ (1− p) · 0 = pw.
The game as described is common knowledge among all agents. In autarky, all agents
produce separately and aggregate production and consumption equal 2 · n. In the efficient
outcome, all contracts are entered and honored: no agent incurs the cost c and aggregate
consumption equals maximum aggregate output 2 · n ·w. Figure 1 depicts the game tree for
the interaction between one investor and one entrepreneur. The triplet (n,w, c) summarizes
the economic fundamentals. We focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
4The probability of an individual case to be served (i.e., to arrive first in line) equals the number of all
permutations of the labels associated with claims filed that have that case listed first, (x− 1)!, divided by the
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Figure 1: The game between one investor and one entrepreneur.
3.2 No Service
As a benchmark, without enforcement, the entrepreneur can keep all the output, knowing that
the contract will not be enforced. Thus, no contract is entered and no project is implemented.
Proposition 1 (None). With no service, the unique equilibrium is autarky.
However, as soon as one claim is enforced, autarky is not an equilibrium anymore. The
contract of an investor who deviates to entering is either honored or enforced.
3.3 Sequential Service
With sequential service, a claim’s position in the queue for service is random, and only the
first claim in line is enforced. This procedural rule can lead to inefficient outcomes.
Proposition 2 (SeqServe). With sequential service, there is an efficient equilibrium as well
as inefficient equilibria in which bwc < n contracts are entered and not honored.
The efficient outcome is an equilibrium because enforcement and the associated cost are
sure if only one entrepreneur were to decide to deviate to breaching their contract. However,
sequential service also allows for inefficient equilibria. In these equilibria, investment is in-
efficiently low and all entrepreneurs that have a contract breach it. If enough entrepreneurs
breach their contract, then enforcement and the associated cost become unlikely enough for
all entrepreneurs that have a contract to find it optimal to breach it. At the same time,
enforcement is still likely enough to motivate some investors to enter the contract.
3.4 Preordered Service
With preordered service, the order of claims is preannounced, and the first claim in line is
enforced. This procedural rule induces unraveling effects that lead to the efficient outcome.
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Proposition 3 (PreOrder). With preordered service, the unique equilibrium is efficient.
Using a preannounced ordered list to line up breached contracts and enforce the first in
line induces full compliance; enforcement is not needed. The intuition is as follows. The
entrepreneur whose contract is listed first does not breach it because they face enforcement
and the associated cost with certainty. The entrepreneur whose contract is listed second
understands this reasoning and concludes that upon breach, they face enforcement and the
associated cost with certainty. As this entrepreneur thus does not breach the contract, the
same argument holds for the entrepreneur whose contract is listed next—and so on. It follows
that all contracts are honored. Therefore, all contracts are entered and aggregate produc-
tion and consumption are maximized. Compared to some outcomes with sequential service,
preordered service reduces the case inflow (and thus the caseload) facing the courts to zero.
3.5 Discussion and an Extension
In this section, we provide a discussion of a number of aspects that might be of interest. In
particular, we discuss our parameter choices in Section 3.5.1, heterogenous project productiv-
ity in Section 3.5.2, our assumptions on the nature of the contracts in Section 3.5.3, and our
assumptions on the judicial process in Section 3.5.4. Finally, we extend the environment to
allow for mistakes and exogenous breach of contracts in Section 3.5.5. We then show under
what conditions preordered service improves the outcome compared to sequential service.
3.5.1 Parameter Choices
Regarding our parameter choices, it can be verified that with w < 2, there is a unique
equilibrium with sequential service, and it is efficient. Similarly, it can be verified that with
w ≥ n ≥ 2, in the inefficient equilibrium with sequential service, while no contract is honored,
all contracts are entered and thus aggregate production is maximized. This equilibrium is
inefficient because one claim is enforced and the associated cost is incurred by some agent, so
that aggregate consumption is not maximized. With a focus on the case of many contracts,
our parameterization n > w ≥ 2 rules out these uninteresting outcomes.
Regarding c ∈ (0,w), the assumption that c > 0 generates a meaningful trade-off between
honoring and not honoring the contract for entrepreneurs who have one. If there was no
cost to the entrepreneur associated with the enforcement of a breached contract, then not
honoring the contract always guarantees at least as high a payoff as honoring the contract.
As to the assumption that c < w, preordered service induces the unraveling effects we describe
irrespective of how high c is as long as c > 0. When service is sequential, a high enough c could
guarantee that no contract is ever breached (e.g., c > (n− 1)w would suffice). However, the
observation that low-profile contract cases clog up the civil courts suggests that c is not high
enough in this sense. To the extent that c cannot be arbitrarily high for there to be contracts
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that are entered and breached when service is sequential, c < w is a convenient restriction.
In certain situations, this restriction can be interpreted as limited liability with respect to
certain costs associated with the court case, but not related to the investor’s compensation.
Of course, the cost c could be another lever policy makers could use to reduce the caseload
at courts, one that we do not focus on here. An example would be to impose extraordinarily
high fines or even time in prison on the breaching party upon enforcement, in addition to
compensation to the investor. However, with such a policy, concerns about the punishment
fitting the offense would almost certainly arise.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Projects
The nature of our predictions is largely unchanged when allowing for heterogeneous projects.
All else the same, let there be two types of projects, nL ≥ 1 projects with low productivity
wL > 1 and nH ≥ 2 projects with high productivity wH ≥ 2, bwHc > bwLc. Assume that
nL + nH > wL > c > 0. With one claim being enforced, the efficient outcome is always
an equilibrium. The breached contract of an entrepreneur who deviates to not honoring
their contract is the only one in line for service and thus enforced with certainty. With
preordered service on the one hand, this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium because a
project’s productivity does not interfere with the unraveling effect at work.
With sequential service on the other hand, an inefficient equilibrium exists. If nH > wH ,
then any profile in which exactly bwHc investors enter a contract with an entrepreneur who
has a project with productivity wH , no other investor enters a contract, and all entrepreneurs
breach their contract if they have one is an equilibrium. If nH ≤ wH , then there are two
cases. If wL < nH + 1, then the profile in which exactly nH investors enter a contract with
an entrepreneur who has a project with productivity wH , no other investor enters a contract,
and all entrepreneurs breach their contract if they have one is an equilibrium. If wL ≥ nH + 1,
then any profile in which nH investors enter a contract with an entrepreneur who has a project
with productivity wH , bwLc − nH investors enter a contract with an entrepreneur who has a
project with productivity wL, no other investor enters a contract, and all entrepreneurs breach
their contract if they have one is an equilibrium. In all cases, production is inefficiently low
and all contracts are breached so that one contract is enforced.
3.5.3 Contracts, Sure Outcomes in Court, and Settlement
We focus on low-profile contract cases with a sure outcome, which constitute the bulk of
the caseload at civil courts. In the interest of simplicity, we assume that claims are either
enforced in this period, or not all. To the extent that preordered and sequential service
determine the order in which arriving court cases are served, this all-or-nothing assumption
can be interpreted as an extreme version of discounting the benefits and costs of a breached
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contract being enforced at some point in the future. The exact terms of the contract, which
we fix exogenously, are not important, as long as there is a meaningful trade-off between
breaching the contract and honoring it. Allowing agents to enter multiple contracts would
not be a problem as long as every potential contract is associated with a uniquely identifying
label. With the same qualification, allowing multiple parties in the same contract would not
be a problem either.
In line with our focus on low-profile contract cases with a sure outcome, we assume that
there is no uncertainty over the court’s ruling. Risk aversion thus plays no role when service is
preordered. If a contract tops the preordered list, then enforcement and the associated cost are
sure upon breach. If sequential service allows for an inefficient equilibrium, preordered service
compares favorably to it. If the court’s ruling were uncertain, then there might be a role
for risk aversion. However, with sequential service, a probability of enforcement upon service
combines with the probability of arriving first in line, and thus of service. By contrast, for
the first contract on the preordered list, the probability of a potential court case being served
is one. Therefore, the probability of facing enforcement and the associated cost is higher
when service is preordered than when it is sequential. Given a probability of enforcement
upon service and an associated cost, the theoretical predictions then remain unaffected for
certain levels of risk aversion. However, recall that Agor et al. (2015, p. 35) suggest that most
contract cases in their dataset are brought only to secure a sure ruling which then allows the
claimant to initiate the legal enforcement of a payment.
For these low-profile contract cases with a sure outcome we focus on, settlement after filing
but before a ruling is issued is not very important.5 However, the probability p of enforcement
in our environment can be interpreted as the probability of the case being disposed by the court
(in this period), be it by ruling or by settlement. The payoffs upon enforcement (settlement)
could easily be altered to account for a potential haircut associated with settlement, or disposal
of the case more generally, without affecting the strategic interaction or the predictions.
Settlements of claims filed with the courts do suffer from court delay when they come about
only after initial or even multiple hearings. With regards to the implementation of preordered
service, when more than one case is served in a period, settled cases simply vacate a spot in
the queue. If settlement currently takes place with a large haircut because the delay until
court service is too long, then preordered service should lead to fewer settlements of filed
claims as court delay decreases.
3.5.4 The Judiciary, Compensation, and False Claims
We assume that the intent of courts and their agents to enforce contracts does not compete
with other objectives, such as political values (see Landes and Posner 2009). More generally,
5Agor et al. (2015) report that about 7% of the contract cases in their data were settled; some settled
contract cases might have been reported as dismissed.
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of course, judges are subject to the incentives posed by the environment they work in (see
Posner 2005). The possibility of convergence to efficient law has been discussed by Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2007) and studied empirically by Niblett et al. (2010).
We assume that upon enforcement of the contract, the investor is fully compensated. We
do not take a stand on what form this compensation takes. Schwartz (1979) and Shavell
(1980, 1984) discuss damages and specific performance as remedies for breach of contract.
Finally, we abstract from intentionally false claims by investors. Suppose that we allowed
for such fraudulent claims in our context without uncertainty over the outcome in court. If
investors whose claims are found to be unsubstantiated face some sort of cost that they would
not otherwise incur, e.g., reputation cost or attorney fees, then preordered service would
prevent these claims from being filed: either the entrepreneur or the investor associated with
the first claim on the list faces a sure cost and would thus prefer that the claim did not exist.
3.5.5 An Extension: Mistakes and Exogenous Breach
In this section, we allow for contracts to be breached by an exogenous shock. Possible inter-
pretations are a liquidity shock or a randomly occurring mistake by the entrepreneur to the
effect that they breach the contract irrespective of whether or not it is optimal to do so. Sup-
pose that after production and collection of their projects’ proceeds, entrepreneurs who have
a contract are subject to an exogenous shock that is independent and identically distributed
across entrepreneurs. This shock breaches the entrepreneur’s contract exogenously with prob-
ability 1− α ∈ (0, 1). In this case, a claim is filed with the courts. Each entrepreneur has a
choice whether or not to honor their contract with probability α ∈ (0, 1).6 All claims arrive
at the court at the same time and in random order, irrespective of whether the contract was
breached exogenously or deliberately. The judiciary cannot distinguish between the nature
of the breach and thus treats all claims equally. The possibility of exogenous breach due to
this random shock as well as the otherwise unchanged structure of the game more generally
are common knowledge among all players. The modified game between one investor and one
entrepreneur is depicted in Figure 2. As before, we focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
For the case of sequential service, we first note that in equilibrium, either all entered
contracts are breached with certainty, or all breached contracts are breached exogenously.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium with sequential service, either all entrepreneurs in a contract breach
it if they have a choice, or all entrepreneurs in a contract honor it if they have a choice.
Lemma 1 states that every equilibrium has to be of one of two types: either (1) all
entrepreneurs in a contract honor it if they have a choice, or (2) all entrepreneurs in a contract
6While entrepreneurs do not have a choice whether or not to enter the contract once the investor enters it,
the probability of exogenous breach should be consistent with them choosing to enter the contract when they























Figure 2: The game between one investor and one entrepreneur with exogenous breach.
breach it if they have a choice. In the former type of equilibrium, in which all entrepreneurs
in a contract honor it if they have a choice, all breached contracts are necessarily breached
exogenously. In this sense, the caseload at the courts is determined exogenously. There is no
point in attempting to reduce the caseload at the courts using policy interventions that aim
at affecting entrepreneurs’ breaching decisions. Entrepreneurs already honor their contracts
if they have a choice. Thus, this type of equilibrium is of limited interest for our purposes.
For completeness, we report conditions an equilibrium of this type has to satisfy, and that for
a low enough probability of exogenous breach, an equilibrium exists in which all contracts are
entered and honored if there is a choice.
Proposition 4. With sequential service, a strategy profile in which exactly k̂ > 1, k̂ < n,
investors enter the contract and all entrepreneurs honor the contract if they have one and











For high enough α, the strategy profile in which all investors enter the contract and all en-
trepreneurs honor the contract if they have one and have a choice is an equilibrium.
By contrast, in the second type of equilibrium, in which all entrepreneurs in a contract
breach it if they have a choice, all contracts that are not breached exogenously are breached
endogenously. In this case, potentially, there is a role for policy interventions that aim at
affecting entrepreneurs’ breaching decisions to reduce the caseload at courts. In this sense,
this type of equilibrium is of more interest for our purposes. We have the following result.
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Proposition 5. With sequential service, every strategy profile in which exactly bwc investors
enter the contract and all entrepreneurs breach the contract if they have one and have a choice
is an equilibrium. There is no such equilibrium in which more than bwc contracts are entered.
In the relevant equilibrium with sequential service, as in the case without the possibility
of exogenous breach, all entered contracts are breached with certainty. Therefore, the pos-
sibility of exogenous breach does not affect investors’ entering decisions and thus the overall
equilibrium outcome or its intuition. When service is preordered, we have the following result.









If k∗ ≥ n, then in every equilibrium, the investors in all n pairs enter the contract and all
entrepreneurs honor it if they have a choice, except possibly the one in pair zn.
If k∗ < n, then in every equilibrium, either k∗ or k∗+ 1 contracts are entered and at most
one entrepreneur with a contract breaches it if they have a choice.
The intuition is similar to before and again derives from unraveling. However, due to
the possibility of exogenous breach, the unraveling effect may extend only to some number
k∗ or k∗ + 1 of the highest-ranked pairs. The exact number of entered contracts depends
on parameters, but for large enough n it is at least k∗. In particular, if the probability of
exogenous breach is small enough (for a large enough α), then this economy enters more
contracts, hence produces more output, and thus experiences higher welfare with preordered
service than with sequential service. Proposition 7 provides a sufficient condition.
Proposition 7. If α ≥ (w/(w+ c))1/(w−1), then more contracts are entered with preordered
service than with sequential service.
The condition in Proposition 7 is sufficient but not necessary. Figure 3 depicts the number
of contracts entered (vertical axis) as a function of α (horizontal axis) for both preordered
service, which is assumed to be k∗ (rather than k∗+ 1, assuming that n is large), and sequential
service, which is bwc. The top-left panel uses the parameters we use in our experiment.
The top-right and bottom-left panels vary the cost c incurred by the entrepreneur upon
enforcement of a breached contract in a symmetric fashion, from 10 percent of w in the top-
left panel to 50 percent of w in the top-right panel to 90 percent of w in the bottom-left panel.
The bottom-right panel considers the case of very high costs c of 99.99 percent of w. As can
be seen in all panels, for high enough α < 1, more contracts are entered with preordered
service than with sequential service. How high α has to be depends on the parameters.
14












































































































































Figure 3: Number of contracts entered for w = 2 and various costs c.
To summarize, more contracts are entered with preordered service than with sequential
service for low enough but strictly positive probabilities 1− α of exogenous breach. In fact,
depending on the parameters, the probability of exogenous breach can be fairly high and
still more contracts are being entered with preordered service than with sequential service.
In this sense, the predictions concerning overall investment for the environment described in
Section 3.1 appear to be robust to the addition of a small chance of exogenous breach via an
independent and identically distributed shock.
What can we say about the caseload at the courts? With sequential service, by Proposition
5, the caseload is bwc, as all entered contracts are breached. By Proposition 6, with preordered
service, either k∗, k∗ + 1, or n contracts are entered, and at most one contract is breached if
there is a choice. It follows that the expected caseload at the courts is lower with preordered
service than with sequential service as long as not too many more contracts are entered with
preordered service than with sequential service. Proposition 8 provides a sufficient condition.
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Proposition 8. Letting k̂ be the number of contracts entered with preordered service, the
expected caseload at courts is lower than with sequential service if k̂ ≤ (bwc − α)/(1− α).
The condition in Proposition 8 is sufficient but not necessary. If at most as many contracts
are entered with preordered service as with sequential service, then the expected caseload is
smaller with preordered service because most or all contracts are honored if there is a choice
while with sequential service, all contracts are breached with certainty. For the same reason, as
bwc ≥ 2 implies that (bwc−α)/(1−α) > bwc, if more contracts are entered with preordered
service than with sequential service, but not too many more, then the expected caseload is
still lower with preordered service than with sequential service. If very many more contracts
are entered with preordered service than with sequential service, then the expected caseload
may be higher with preordered service than with sequential service—for the purely mechanical
reason that so many more contracts are entered and each one of them faces an independent
chance of being breached exogenously.
To summarize, the expected caseload is lower with preordered service than with sequential
service unless there are too many more contracts entered with preordered service than with
sequential service. In this sense, the predictions concerning the caseload at the courts for the
environment described in Section 3.1 appear to be robust to the addition of a small chance of
exogenous breach via an independent and identically distributed shock as well.
4 Evidence
For preordered service to be effective, it requires individuals to iteratively eliminate dominated
strategies and backward induct. As we do not observe preordered service in practice, we ran
a laboratory experiment to verify whether or not, compared to sequential service, preordered
service may reduce the number of contract cases filed with the courts. We describe the
experimental design in Section 4.1, state our hypotheses in Section 4.2, and report our findings
in Section 4.3. We discuss and interpret our empirical findings in Section 4.4.
4.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment has three treatments that implement the model studied in Section 3, com-
prising a population of the game described in Figure 1. The exogenous contract terms allow
us to focus on the strategic interaction the different procedural rules give rise to. The payoffs
to both players are equal when there is no investment, as well as when the investor enters
the contract and the entrepreneur honors it. Thus, aversion to inequality in payoffs cannot
be a potential motive for investors’ actions.7 The binary action set of both players lends
7Bohnet and Huck (2004) and Bohnet et al. (2005) study binary trust games in which the no-investment
outcome has first-movers earning more than second-movers. In contrast, the no-investment outcome in Bohnet
et al. (2001) is zero for both players.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
None SeqServe PreOrder
# subjects 96 96 96
# economies 6 6 6
conceptual simplicity. If the investor had a continuous investment decision as in the standard
trust game, then the entrepreneur would have to have a choice to decline the contract: the
entrepreneur’s payoff in the case of no investment might be greater than the payoff implied
by a very small investment. Such additional complications would be a distraction.
When describing the game in the experimental materials we avoided the terminology used
in the paper. Instead, we used generic labels for both players, as well as their actions. In
all experimental sessions, we randomly assigned subjects to one of two roles: Player A and
Player B. Each Player A was given a label, A1 to A8, which he or she kept for the duration
of the experiment; Player Bs had no labels. At the start of each experimental round, Player
B was told the label of the Player A he or she was matched with. Player A had the option
to Enter or to Stay; in the latter case, both players got a payoff of 1 Experimental Currency
Unit (ECU). If Player A chose Enter, then Player B had the option of either Send or Keep.
The former option gave each player 2 ECU; the latter option gave 0 ECU to Player A and 4
ECU to Player B if the contract was not enforced, and 2 ECU to Player A and 1.8 ECU to
Player B if the contract was enforced. In terms of our model, this corresponds to w = 2 and
c = 0.2, or 10% of Player B’s share of the surplus.
The three treatments differ in the way we operationalize the probability of enforcing a
claim in the event of Player B choosing Keep. Our baseline condition is the None treatment,
in which the probability of enforcement, p, is set to zero. This treatment corresponds to the
case where there is no contract enforcement. Its purpose is to establish the baseline level
of investment and compliance—the extent to which entered contracts are being honored—in
our sample. The SeqServe treatment introduces enforcement of exactly one claim, which
is chosen at random from the pool of claims in a given experimental round. This treatment
captures sequential service at courts: claims are processed on a first-come-first-served basis
and a claim’s spot in the queue is random. Finally, the PreOrder treatment implements
preordered service. All pairs in which Player B chose Keep in a given round are ranked
in descending order of Player A label. The pair whose Player A has the highest label is
selected for enforcement with certainty, and all others are not selected. Table 1 outlines the
experimental design, and the sample size in each treatment. The unit of observation is an
economy, which consists of eight investor-entrepreneur pairs. We collected six economies per
treatment.
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4.1.1 Information and Feedback
We assigned labels to Player As because they are essential to operationalize the PreOrder
treatment; Player As in None and SeqServe also had labels for consistency. Individual
Player As kept their label throughout the experiment for two reasons. First, had we randomly
assigned Player A labels every round, then the positions of Player As on the list in PreOrder
would have changed every round. That is, while the strategic environment for Player As is
unchanged from round to round in SeqServe and None, it would have changed every round
for Player As in PreOrder. By fixing labels, we made the strategic environment stationary
for Player As in all three treatments. Second, fixed labels are also realistic, as most identifying
information for individuals and firms (e.g., taxpayer numbers) are unique to those individuals
and do not vary. We did not assign labels to Player Bs because we did not want to introduce
reputation concerns: if Player As could keep a history of past interactions for each Player B
in the economy, they would be able to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy
Player Bs. This discrimination in turn can work as an extremely effective disciplining device,
even in finitely repeated trust games (Bohnet and Huck 2004; Bohnet et al. 2005).
In all treatments, the end-of-round feedback screen subjects saw had two separate sections:
one section had information about the round for all pairs in the economy, and the other had
information about the outcome for that subject’s pair (see Appendix C.4). The former section
provided information about the ‘Number of Player Bs that chose Keep’ and the ‘Number of
Pairs Selected’.8 This feedback levels the playing field from an informational point of view for
all subjects within a treatment, as well as across treatments. Even though our experiment
simulates a one-shot environment, subjects can still learn about the population of players
with whom they interact. Therefore, the informational environment should provide the same
conditions for learning in the three treatments. This is particularly so in cases where the
investor enters the contract, the entrepreneur breaches it, and their contract is enforced. In
PreOrder, both players can immediately infer that either there were no instances of contract
breach for any pair whose Player A had a higher label and invested, or that no Player A with
a higher label invested. That is, those two players can infer an upper bound on the number of
breaches in a round. This inference is not possible in SeqServe. Providing the total number
of breaches in the economy in that round levels the information subjects can use to learn from
round to round in both treatments.
4.1.2 Procedures
We implemented economies with eight pairs. We ran 10 experimental sessions, eight of which
had 32 participants while two sessions had 16 participants for a total of 288 participants.
8The second sentence was not included in the feedback screen in the None treatment.
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In each of the 32-participant sessions, we ran two separate economies in parallel.9 In each
session, subjects sat at a booth which did not allow for visual or verbal communication. The
experimenter handed written copies of the instructions, which included a quiz to check for
understanding.10 Subjects read the instructions and completed the quiz in their own time;
the experimenter checked their answers and clarified any questions individually if necessary.
Once all subjects had their questions checked, the experiment started. There were two practice
rounds so that subjects could get familiarized with the software interface. After the second
practice round ended, the software informed subjects that the incentivized part would begin.
The incentivized part of the experiment consisted of 20 rounds, three of which were randomly
selected by the computer for payment. In all rounds, the computer randomly matched a Player
A with a Player B. We programmed the experimental software in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007),
and we recruited our subjects from a pool of undergraduate students from the University of
Exeter from a variety of majors using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). No subject in the sample took
part in more than one session, and nobody in the sample had registered for a trust game
experiment before taking part in our experiment. The sessions took place in the FEELE lab
at the University of Exeter in October and November 2016. Payoffs in the experiment were
denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). One ECU was worth £2; subjects also
received £3 for participating. Sessions lasted on average 50 minutes and the average payment
was £12.26 ($15.30).
4.2 Hypotheses
The objective of the experiment is to check if preordered service decreases the number of
contract cases filed with courts relative to sequential service in an economy consisting of many
two-party contracts. As shown in Section 3, the unique equilibrium with preordered service
is efficient, while sequential service allows for an efficient equilibrium as well as inefficient
equilibria; without enforcement, autarky prevails. Our first hypothesis concerns the caseload
faced by courts, and the impact the different procedural rules have on cases filed. We therefore
focus on the two treatments where there is a judiciary to enforce claims.
Hypothesis 1 (Caseload). The caseload faced by courts in PreOrder is smaller than or
equal to that in SeqServe.
Our next two hypotheses decompose caseload by looking at its two behavioral determi-
nants: entrepreneur compliance, and investors’ decision whether or not to invest. The None
treatment serves as a no-enforcement benchmark condition.
Hypothesis 2 (Compliance). Treatments are ranked on the basis of the proportion of con-
tracts being honored: PreOrder ≥ SeqServe > None.
9A large number of no-shows in one of the scheduled sessions forced us to run the two 16-person sessions.
10All instructions as well as screenshots of the experimental interface are collected in Appendix C.
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Hypothesis 3 (Investment). Treatments are ranked on the basis of the number of contracts
being entered: PreOrder ≥ SeqServe > None.
4.3 Empirical Findings
In our analysis of the experimental data we use two complementary approaches. We test
average treatment effects using non-parametric statistical tests, using economy averages as
independent observations.11 Panel data econometric techniques, which take advantage of
the repeated nature of the experiment, merely confirm the results; as such, this analysis
is relegated to Appendix B. Given that we have directional hypotheses, p-values relating to
hypothesis tests refer to one-sided tests. To facilitate the discussion, and to be consistent with
the terminology of our model, we refer to the first-mover player (Player A in the experimental
instructions) as the investor. Likewise, we refer to the second-mover player (Player B in the
experimental instructions) as the entrepreneur. In Sections 4.3.1–4.3.5, we present our results
with support. In Section 4.4, we offer an integrated discussion and interpretations.
4.3.1 Caseload
In this section, we compare the caseload generated by economies under the two procedural
rules. We compare the average of six observations of the total caseload in an economy, over
20 rounds, as well as the first and final rounds to ascertain for learning effects. The top left
panel in Figure 4 displays the total caseload in SeqServe and PreOrder over the course of
the twenty rounds; the top right panel shows average caseload round-by-round. The bottom
panels show average caseload in the first and final rounds of the experiment.
Result 1 (Caseload). Caseload is substantially lower in PreOrder than in SeqServe.
Support. In Figure 4, we observe a significantly lower (average) caseload in PreOrder than
in SeqServe. Over the whole sample, there were just over 32 cases filed on average in
PreOrder and just over 57 in SeqServe (z = 2.882, p = 0.002, MW test). In the first
round, 3.33 cases were filed on average in SeqServe and 2.17 in PreOrder (z = 1.187, p =
0.235, MW test). However, by the final round of the experiment, there were 1.17 cases filed
on average in PreOrder and 2.5 in SeqServe (z = 2.331, p = 0.010, MW test). The
analysis of caseload over time corroborates this result. Average caseload is always lower in
PreOrder than in SeqServe; we also find a negative and significant linear time trend
on caseload in both PreOrder (−0.064, p < 0.001), and SeqServe (−0.029, p = 0.003).
However, the linear trend in PreOrder is significantly different from that in SeqServe
(F (1, 11) = 7.48, p = 0.019), indicating a faster rate of decline in caseload in PreOrder.
11We use MW to denote the Mann-Whitney test, WSR to denote the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test and JT





































































































































Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals based on economy−level clustered standard errors.
Round 20
Figure 4: Caseload. Top Left: All rounds. Top Right: Time series. Bottom Left: First
round of the experiment. Bottom Right: Last round of the experiment.
In the next two sections, we decompose this result; first by looking at average compliance
conditional on investment, and then by looking at average investment. We add to the analysis
the data from the None treatment, which gives us benchmark compliance and investment in
the absence of courts.
4.3.2 Compliance
In this section, we compare entrepreneurs’ behavior in the three treatments. We take the
average of compliance decisions for all eight entrepreneurs in an economy (conditional on
investment taking place) over 20 rounds (N ≤ 160 per economy, since investment did not
always happen) as one observation. We have six such observations. Figure 5 depicts the
relative frequency with which entrepreneurs complied with the contract, that is, honored it.
The top left panel considers all twenty experimental rounds; the top right panel looks at
average compliance round-by-round. The bottom panels depict compliance in the first and
last round.
Result 2 (Compliance). Average compliance is higher in PreOrder than in both SeqServe
and None. There is no difference in average compliance between SeqServe and None.
Support. In Figure 5, we observe a significantly higher average compliance level in PreOrder




















































































































































































Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals based on economy−level clustered standard errors.
Round 20
Figure 5: Compliance. Top Left: All rounds. Top Right: Time series. Bottom Left:
First round of the experiment. Bottom Right: Last round of the experiment.
z = 2.882, p = 0.002; PreOrder vs None: z = 2.402, p = 0.008; MW test). In the
first round of the experiment, all three treatments perform rather similarly (PreOrder vs
SeqServe: z = 0.734, p = 0.463; PreOrder vs None: z = 0.567, p = 0.570; SeqServe
vs None: z = 1.043, p = 0.297; MW test). However, as the bottom left panel of Figure 5
shows, by the final round of the experiment the difference in compliance between PreOrder
and the other two treatments is large and highly significant (PreOrder vs SeqServe: z =
2.887, p = 0.002; PreOrder vs None: z = 2.917, p = 0.002; MW test). In contrast, we
do not find a significant difference in average compliance between SeqServe and None over
all rounds (z = 0.000, p = 0.500; MW test) but a marginal significance in the final round
(z = 1.624, p = 0.052; MW test).
The top right panel of Figure 5 corroborates this result by displaying the evolution of
compliance over time. Fitting a linear time trend on the average per round compliance
in each treatment, we find a negative and significant trend in None (−0.014,F (1, 17) =
11.11, p = 0.004), a negative, though not significantly different from zero, trend in SeqServe
(−0.002,F (1, 17) = 1.85, p = 0.191), and a positive and highly significant time trend in Pre-
Order (0.012,F (1, 17) = 24.76, p < 0.001).12 That is, while compliance declined over time
in the None treatment—which is consistent with the existing evidence on trust games (e.g.,















































































































































































Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals based on economy−level clustered standard errors.
Round 20
Figure 6: Investment. Top Left: All rounds. Top Right: Time series. Bottom Left:
First round of the experiment. Bottom Right: Last round of the experiment.
Bohnet and Huck 2004)—compliance remained roughly constant in the SeqServe treatment
and actually increased over time in the PreOrder treatment.
4.3.3 Investment
In this section, we compare investors’ behavior in the three treatments. We take the average of
investment decisions for all eight investors in an economy over 20 rounds as one observation
(N = 160 per economy). We have six such observations. Figure 6 depicts the relative
frequency with which investors entered into a contract with the entrepreneur. As in previous
figures, we display average investment over 20 rounds, the first and last round, as well as a
round-by-round plot.
Result 3 (Investment). Average investment is higher in both PreOrder and SeqServe than
in None. There is no difference in average investment between PreOrder and SeqServe.
Support. In Figure 6, we observe a significantly higher level of investment in PreOrder
than in None over all rounds (z = 2.406, p = 0.008, MW test). This difference belies the
evolution of investment over the course of the experiment. In the first round, there is no
difference in average investment (z = 1.338, p = 0.181, MW test); by the final round, average







































Figure 7: Breakdown of Average Investment and Compliance By Investor Label.
While SeqServe significantly outperforms None over all rounds (z = 2.330, p = 0.010, MW
test), there is only a marginally significant difference in average investment in both the first
(z = 0.818, p = 0.413, MW test) and the final round (z = 1.483, p = 0.069, MW test). When
comparing SeqServe to PreOrder, the difference in average investment is not significant
over the course of the experiment (z = 1.000, p = 0.500, MW test). Investment in SeqServe
is marginally significantly higher than in PreOrder in the first round (z = 1.721, p =
0.085, MW test); however, by the final round average investment is nominally (though not
significantly) higher in PreOrder: z = 1.257, p = 0.105; MW test).
This again illustrates the role of the evolution of average investment over time in the
three treatments as depicted in the top right panel of Figure 6: in None, there is a neg-
ative and significant (−0.019,F (1, 17) = 25.35, p = 0.002) time trend on investment. The
time trend on investment in SeqServe is also negative and significantly different from zero
(−0.010,F (1, 17) = 12.15, p = 0.003). In contrast, the linear trend on investment in Pre-
Order is flat and not significantly different from zero (0.0003,F (1, 17) = 0.00, p = 0.948).
4.3.4 Compliance and Investment Conditional on Labels
In this section we look at individual behavior in more detail. A closer look at Figures 5 and 6,
in particular the 95% confidence intervals around the sample means, suggests that the variance
in both compliance and investment is higher in SeqServe than in PreOrder. Figure 7
breaks down investment and compliance by investor label. Column heights represent average
investment for each label. The dark portion in each column represents the proportion of cases
where the entrepreneurs honored the contract; the light portion represents the proportion of
cases where entrepreneurs breached the contract.
Result 4 (Labels).
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a. There is a positive relationship between investment/compliance and investor labels in
PreOrder but not in None or SeqServe.
b. The levels of investment and compliance for investors with the six highest labels in Pre-
Order are greater than or equal to those levels for the average investor in SeqServe
and None.
c. There is less variance in individual investment decisions in PreOrder than either in
None or SeqServe.
Support. a. Visual inspection of Figure 7 suggests that average investment and compliance
vary with label in PreOrder but not in None or SeqServe. To test for a relationship
between labels and investment/compliance, we compute the average investment by individual
investor, as well as the average compliance experienced by individual investors over twenty
rounds in an economy and take that to be our independent unit of observation. We then
compute Spearman correlation coefficients (ρ), as well as the (non-parametric) Jonkheere-
Thepstra test (JT) for ordered alternatives.13
In PreOrder we find evidence of a strong relationship between investor labels and in-
vestment. There is a positive correlation between investment and investor labels (ρ =
0.76, p < 0.001); the JT test rejects the null of joint equality against the ordered alterna-
tive (J∗ = 5.950, p < 0.001). We also find evidence of a strong relationship between investor
labels and compliance. The correlation between compliance and labels is positive and highly
significant (ρ = 0.92, p < 0.001); the JT test rejects the null of joint equality against the
ordered alternative (J∗ = 7.213, p < 0.001).
In SeqServe we find no evidence of a relationship between investor labels and investment.
There is a negative but non-significant correlation between investment and investor labels
(ρ = −0.14, p = 0.350); the JT test does not reject the null of joint equality (J∗ = −0.945,
p = 0.345). We also find no evidence of any relationship between investor labels and compli-
ance. The correlation between compliance and labels is essentially zero and non-significant
(ρ = 0.03, p = 0.844); the JT test does not reject the null of joint equality (J∗ = 0.296,
p = 0.767).
In None we find very weak evidence of a positive relationship between investor labels and
investment. There is a positive, weakly significant correlation between investment and in-
vestor labels (ρ = 0.24, p = 0.098), but the JT test does not reject the null of joint equality
(J∗ = 1.637, p = 0.102). We find no evidence of any relationship between investor labels and
compliance. The correlation between compliance and labels is positive but non-significant
13The JT test tests for the null hypothesis of joint equality of medians against an ordered alternative
hypothesis. The alternative is that the median investment level is increasing or decreasing in the investor
labels. We report J∗-statistics that correct for ties.
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(ρ = 0.16, p = 0.283); the JT test does not reject the null of joint equality (J∗ = 1.037,
p = 0.300).
b. We compare the average investment by an investor in PreOrder conditional on a
label to the average investment by all investors in None and SeqServe. To do this, we take
the average investment over the twenty rounds of the experiment for each investor as the
independent observation.14
The level of investment by investors with labels A8–A5 in PreOrder is significantly higher
than that by investors in None (all comparisons, z ≥ 2.193, p ≤ 0.028, MW test) and Se-
qServe (A6: z = 1.740, p = 0.082; all other comparisons, z ≥ 2.168, p ≤ 0.030, MW test).
Also, the level of investment by investors with labels A4–A2 in PreOrder is not significantly
different to that by investors in None (all comparisons, z ≤ 1.448, p ≥ 0.148, MW test); the
average level of investment by investors with labels A4–A3 in PreOrder is not significantly
different to that by investors in SeqServe (all comparisons, z ≤ 1.269, p ≥ 0.204, MW test).
In contrast, the level of investment by investors with label A1 in PreOrder is significantly
lower than that by investors in None (z = 3.146, p = 0.002, MW test). Likewise, the level of
investment by investors with labels A2 and A1 in PreOrder is significantly lower than that
by investors in SeqServe (all comparisons, z ≥ 2.168, p ≤ 0.030, MW test).
We observe the same pattern when looking at compliance conditional on investment. The
level of compliance experienced by investors with labels A8–A5 in PreOrder is significantly
higher than that experienced by investors in None (all comparisons, z ≥ 3.175, p ≤ 0.001,
MW test) and SeqServe (all comparisons, z ≥ 3.622, p ≤ 0.001, MW test). The level of
compliance experienced by investors with labels A4 and A3 in PreOrder is not significantly
different to that experienced by investors in None (all comparisons, z ≤ 0.734, p ≥ 0.463,
MW test) or SeqServe (all comparisons, z ≤ 0.868, p ≥ 0.385, MW test). In contrast, aver-
age compliance experienced by investors with labels A2 and A1 in PreOrder is significantly
lower than that by investors in None (all comparisons, z ≥ 1.658, p ≤ 0.097, MW test) or
SeqServe (all comparisons, z = 1.936, p ≤ 0.053, MW test).
c. We take advantage of the fact that the investors’ decision is a binary variable. Therefore,
the sample standard deviation of an individual’s investment decisions over the twenty rounds
in the experiment is maximized when a given investor invests half of the time (i.e., in ten
out of twenty rounds), and it is minimized when an investor either always invests or never
invests. We calculate the standard deviation of investment decisions for each investor in our
sample. The mean standard deviation in investment decisions in PreOrder is 0.248, and
it is significantly lower than that in SeqServe (0.401; z = 4.260, p < 0.001, MW test) and
None (0.403, z = 3.945, p < 0.001, MW test). In contrast, there is no difference in mean
14Note that since we are making comparisons across treatments and labels were fixed within an economy,
these are statistically independent observations. Also note that the non-parametric tests we employ are robust




























Figure 8: Average Payoffs to Investors and Entrepreneurs.
standard deviation between SeqServe and None (z = 0.774, p = 0.439; MW test).
4.3.5 Payoffs
We complete our analysis by examining players’ payoffs across the three treatments. Figure
8 depicts average payoffs for both types of players over the 20 rounds. The height of the bar
represents average total payoffs. The dark portion of the bar denotes average investor payoffs,
and the light portion denotes average entrepreneur payoffs.
Result 5 (Payoffs).
a. In all treatments, the average payoff to investors from investing is at least as high as
that from not investing.
b. Average investor payoff is higher in both PreOrder and SeqServe than in None.
Average investor payoff is higher in PreOrder than in SeqServe.
c. Average entrepreneur payoff is lower in PreOrder than in SeqServe.
Support. a. Using the average payoff of all investors in an economy as an independent obser-
vation, we test against the null that average payoff is equal to one. We reject the null in the
cases of PreOrder (z = 3.064, p < 0.01, WSR test) and SeqServe (z = 2.680, p < 0.01,
WSR test), but we cannot reject it in the case of None (z = 1.503, p = 0.133, WSR test).
b. Using the average investor payoff in an economy as an independent observation, we
perform a series of pairwise tests of equality of payoffs. The average investor payoff in Pre-
Order is 1.42, which is significantly higher than the average investor payoff in SeqServe
(1.10, z = 2.882, p < 0.01, MW test), and significantly higher than the average investor payoff
in None (0.93; z = 2.882, p < 0.01, MW test). In turn, average investor payoff in SeqServe
is also significantly higher than that in None (z = 2.082, p = 0.04, MW test).
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c. We perform the same exercise using average entrepreneur payoffs. The average en-
trepreneur payoff in PreOrder is 1.77, which is not significantly different from the average
entrepreneur payoff in None (1.94, z = 1.601, p = 0.11, MW test); it is significantly different
from the average entrepreneur payoff in SeqServe (2.02, z = 2.817, p < 0.01, MW test).
Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in average entrepreneur payoffs between
SeqServe and None (z = 1.506, p = 0.132, MW test).
4.4 Discussion of the Experiment and Our Findings
The objective of our experiment is to compare the performance of preordered service to that
of sequential service. We find that preordered service indeed substantially reduces the case
inflow facing the judiciary. It does so throughout the experiment, up to the very last round.
We find this is primarily driven by higher entrepreneur compliance.
When examining the performance of the procedural rules, it is useful to compare them
with None, which is a binary version of the trust game (Berg et al. 1995). None provides
the baseline level of investment and compliance in the absence of any procedure for contract
enforcement. Consistent with the existing literature on trust games,15 we observe positive,
albeit declining levels of trust and trustworthiness in our sample. How do SeqServe and
PreOrder compare? Investment levels are significantly higher in SeqServe than in None,
but compliance levels are not. The increase in investment is easily rationalizable, as investors
have a positive probability of at least 1/8 of being made whole, as opposed to zero in None.
Investors in SeqServe and None earn on average the same payoff: that which they would
have earned had they not invested at all. However, average aggregate payoff in both treat-
ments is 50% higher than that if investment had not taken place. Therefore, investors could be
motivated by efficiency concerns (Engelmann and Strobel 2004). In contrast, the PreOrder
treatment improves both investment and compliance relative to None. In other words, effec-
tive enforcement is not just about the availability of arbitration per se, but also about what
procedures govern arbitration itself.
Comparing the two procedural rules directly, we find that preordered service outperforms
sequential service in terms of entrepreneur compliance, but not in terms of investment. We
did not consider a longer time horizon in the lab, as this could lead to subject fatigue and
compromise decision quality. However, the negative time trend in investment in SeqServe
and the flat time trend in PreOrder suggest that with a sufficiently long time horizon,
PreOrder might have outperformed SeqServe in this dimension as well.
While we cannot demonstrate in our experiment that preordered service leads to more
low-profile contracts being entered than sequential service, it does reduce the inflow of court
cases for breach of such low-profile contracts. Informed by the literature mentioned above
15For a review of evidence from the lab, see Camerer (2003); for field data, see Henrich et al. (2001).
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(Palumbo et al. 2013; Chemin 2012; Jappelli et al. 2005; Fabbri 2010), we would expect the
resulting reduced overall caseload to speed up the courts, leading to a more efficient allocation
of resources—in particular, to more lending and investment with higher profile, and more firm
growth—and thus higher welfare. Moreover, it is conceivable that breaching a contract is
associated with additional efficiency costs that we have not accounted for. For example, upon
breach, the entrepreneur might not be able to enjoy the full output of the project because, e.g.,
diverting resources through unofficial channels and disguising the illegitimate nature of the
proceeds might incur a deadweight loss. That is, every breached contract might be associated
with an efficiency loss. It might thus be the case that preordered service increases welfare due
the smaller number of breached contracts, even if overall investment does not increase.
The preordered service rule implemented in PreOrder exhibits sorting characteristics:
investors whose labels put them on the top half of the list almost always invested, and on
average their contracts where almost always honored. In turn, investors on the very bottom
of the list rarely invested. Remarkably, this sorting occurred with only very little information
compared to reputation transmission environments that successfully promote trust (Bohnet
and Huck 2004; Bohnet et al. 2005). In addition to their own pair’s label, players only knew
the total number of breaches by entrepreneurs in previous rounds, which at best puts a lower
bound on the total level of investment. This lack of detailed information is particularly
important when service is preordered. The equilibrium in this case requires players to realize
that entrepreneurs should choose to comply, and that therefore investment is safe, which
might be easier with more detailed information.
Had we provided full disclosure about the outcome in each pair in the economy, the
performance in PreOrder might have improved (faster), as subjects would have observed
almost perfect compliance for the pairs with label A8 and A7. Had we not provided any
feedback to subjects on breaches by other entrepreneurs in the economy, PreOrder would
have had an inherent advantage over SeqServe. In PreOrder, if the entrepreneur in a pair
breaches the contract, then the players in that pair can infer from their enforcement outcome
the behavior of players in pairs in line before them as well as, potentially, an upper bound on
the number of breaches in that round. This sort of inference is not possible in SeqServe. As
such, our choice of end-of-round aggregate feedback removed an informational edge inherent
to PreOrder.
It is clear that the behavior in the experiment did not match the equilibrium predictions
of our model, particularly in the case of PreOrder. That being said, we are not interested
in testing theoretical point predictions, but rather treatment effects. While efficiency and
reciprocity preferences likely played a role in determining investment and compliance, they do
not explain the decline in compliance and investment along the queue. A natural candidate
explanation is that subjects in our experiment were boundedly rational, and that they may
have had difficulty performing the reasoning inherent to the equilibrium of the model.
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However, popular models of boundedly rational agents struggle to explain behavior in
this treatment. Take for instance the level-k model proposed by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and
Wilson (1995). Assuming that a level-0 player selects a strategy at random, it can be verified
that the optimal action by a Player B with sophistication level 1 (and a reasonable degree
of risk aversion) in any position below A8 is to breach. By breaching the contract, such a
player can either achieve a payoff of 4 ECU with probability 0.5, or a payoff of 1.8 ECU
with probability 0.5; by honoring the contract, that player gets a sure payoff of 2 ECU.16 In
turn, a level-2 Player B will find it dominant to breach. As such, any Player B that has a
sophistication level greater than or equal to 1 will optimally breach. As a consequence, the
cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) makes the same prediction.
As the success of preordered service builds on iterated elimination of dominated strategies
and backward induction, it is conceivable that it will fail to outperform sequential service for
a large enough number of pairs in our experimental economy, in which only one breached
contract is enforced. We think that the robustness of our findings with respect to the number
of pairs in the economy is of some, but limited interest. As long as preordered service is
effective for some nontrivial list length, the courts can use many lists of at most that length.
What that critical length is and how the many lists are best generated and employed is an
empirical question that a laboratory experiment is not well-suited to answer. We discuss these
and other aspects of preordered service in practice in Section 5.
5 Taking Preordered Service to Practice
In this section, we depart from the simplified exposition we adopt throughout to discuss
how preordered service could be taken to practice. To start, note that throughout we use
“enforcement” to mean that the courts hold hearings and issue a ruling that can then be used
in enforcement proceedings; and preordered service determines the order of initial hearings of
court cases. Also recall that the focus of this paper as well as the bulk of the caseload at civil
courts are low-profile contract cases with a sure outcome in court.
Regarding concerns that some might have about equal access to justice when service at
courts is preordered—which may explain why this sort of procedural rule has not emerged—
we submit two observations. First, in theory, while there is a hierarchy of potential contract
cases ex ante, in equilibrium, access to justice is equal. Second, to some extent, many legal
systems already distinguish between various types of court cases at a general level. Often civil
cases are differentiated by the amount claimed. For instance, small claims are typically dealt
with by different courts than larger commercial disputes. That is, specialized courts already
16A player would require a coefficient of relative risk aversion of at least 7.53 to prefer compliance; this degree
of risk aversion is not only implausible, as argued by Rabin (2000), but also not observed in most laboratory
or field experiments measuring individual risk aversion (Biswanger 1980; Holt and Laury 2002).
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exist, and they give priority to certain types of cases by definition.
The additional administrative costs of introducing preordered service of low-profile con-
tract cases with a sure outcome in practice are likely to be manageable. One would have to
identify the categories of contract cases that preordered service should be applied to. For
each of these categories, an appropriate period of time to be used, which might vary across
categories, has to be determined. These time frames would likely relate to payment patterns
commonly associated with the respective contract category, account for a grace period, and
accommodate other timing-related aspects inherent to both the contract category and the
legal system. Recall that many of the low-profile contract cases we focus on are debt collec-
tions and landlord-tenant disputes. As examples that could lead to disputes fitting into these
categories, cellphone and housing rental contracts tend to specify monthly payments.
Given these categories and the associated specified periods of time, with a preordered
list in place and announced, when new court cases are filed, those cases belonging to these
categories have to be identified. One possibility is to use a form on which the type of contract
the case concerns is to be indicated. Court personnel would have to collect and store the
information relating to filed contract cases belonging to these categories. At the end of the
specified period, they would have to order the filed cases according to the preordered list.
Then, one might have to hold special hours at, e.g., small claims courts to deal with these
cases. To the extent that many of the types of cases in question are already heard at small
claims courts, a reduced caseload due to preordered service of these cases reduces delay at
these courts, if any, and allows to reallocate resources to other courts and activities.
As to the list, a prerequisite for preordered service is that collating and ordering uniquely
identifying information to the extent required is not unlawful, e.g., regarding privacy con-
cerns. Once such concerns are addressed, preordered service can make use of existing uniquely
identifying information, such as taxpayer numbers. It can equally well use newly randomly
generated and assigned numbers. In principle, it does not matter whether the identifying label
associated with a claim refers to the plaintiff, the defendant, or is a combination of information
relating to both. Courts can use any randomly generated ordered list of these labels. There
can be many different lists for different contract types—as well as many different lists for the
same contract type, in which case each potential contract can appear on only one of the lists.
All of these lists can order the labels in the same way, or in different ways. Notice that our
focus on serving only one court case is a stark simplification. Agor et al. (2015) suggest that
the U.S. court system has the capacity to dispose more than 18 million civil cases per year.17
That is, the court system can promise that, for each of these lists, very many filed court cases
can be served so that, potentially, very many breached contracts can be enforced.
These last couple of points also suggest a way to allay the concern that very long lists
17Agor et al. (2015, p. 16) state that the 925,344 cases in their dataset, which where disposed between July
1, 2012 and June 30, 2013, amount to about five percent of the U.S. state courts civil caseload.
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may make it more difficult for preordered service to work as theory suggests: courts could use
many shorter lists. These lists could be based on subject matter categories, contract type,
industry, geography, or any other relevant characteristic. In fact, as mentioned in Section 3.5,
Agor et al. (2015) report that the contract cases in their dataset are mostly debt collections,
landlord-tenant disputes, and foreclosures, suggesting rather broad natural categories to start
from. As argued above, on each list, many cases can be served. How many (or how few) lists
are necessary to successfully implement preordered service of low-profile contract cases will
depend on legal jurisdiction and legal custom. Answering this question—which is inevitably
an empirical one—is beyond the scope of this paper and straddles economics, public policy,
and law.
In order to allow for multiple contractual relationships per entity, contracts can be ranked
lexicographically, where the first and second coordinates of the label could be the respective
taxpayer numbers of the associated parties. To allow for multiple contracts between the
same parties the label can be extended by an index in any arbitrary way. At the outset, a
conceivable number of contracts between the same parties within the reference period, say
100, or 1000, could be fixed, and an index running from 1 to 100, or 1000, can be attached to
the identifying label of the contracting parties to thereby uniquely identify any one of their
contracts. This approach also works with financial intermediaries. Similarly, contracts with
more than two parties can be accommodated in much the same way, as long as every contract
is associated with a uniquely identifying label. There could be separate lists for contracts
involving two parties, three parties, four parties, and so on.
Alternatively, for each entity that can enter contracts, one could simply use its taxpayer
number, combine it with an index indicating the count of contracts the entity is a party to, and
identify contracts with multiple labels, each one associated with one of the involved parties.
That is, a contract with three parties could have three different labels, each one made up
of, for example, one party’s taxpayer number and an index referring to this specific contract
among all the hundreds, or thousands, of contracts this entity signed during the reference
time period. Of course, uniquely identifying a contract with multiple labels is not a problem.
A filed court case associated with two different uniquely identifying labels is served at the
position of the higher ranked label of the two. The position at the lower ranked label of the
two is simply vacant as the case has already had its initial hearing. These approaches also
work when contracts are made through intermediaries.
All preordered service of low-profile contract cases with a sure outcome requires is that
all potential contracts are associated with at least one uniquely identifying label, according
to which they can be ordered at the outset. There could be multiple such labels for each
contract, or only for some, and many ordered lists. Identifying the best way to implement it
requires further research and, again, straddles economics, public policy, and law.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Delay and case backlog are evident at civil courts in many countries and have been shown
to be linked to more breaches of contract and less investment, less lending and tighter credit
constraints, higher firm financing costs and smaller firms. We offer a conceptual demonstration
of a procedural rule that may help mitigate an important source of delay and backlog: the
large number of civil cases filed. Our procedural rule stipulates that courts line up low-
profile contract cases for service using a preannounced ranking by some uniquely identifying
information of at least one party to the contract. We call this procedure preordered service,
as compared to sequential service, which lines up civil cases in order of arrival.
We offer proof of concept by presenting preordered service in a stylized environment. We
demonstrate that replacing sequential service of low-profile contract cases with preordered
service has the potential to reduce the caseload at courts. In an experimental investigation,
preordered service reduces the number of contract cases filed with the courts by more than 40
percent compared to sequential service. As contracts are honored more frequently, investors
can expect a higher payoff. While our analysis is not suited to discuss the economy’s pro-
gression when preordered service is first adopted to replace sequential service, to some extent
the sequence of one-shot games our subjects played in the experiment can be interpreted as
one-shot interactions in a stylized economy. In that case, the time series of the investment
and breach decisions seems to suggest that the positive effects of preordered service compared
to sequential service become more pronounced over time.
While we cannot demonstrate in our experiment that preordered service leads to more low-
profile contracts being entered than sequential service, it does reduce the inflow of court cases
for breach of such low-profile contracts. Informed by the insights of a growing literature (e.g.,
Palumbo et al. 2013; Chemin 2012; Jappelli et al. 2005; Fabbri 2010), we would expect the
resulting reduced overall caseload to speed up the courts, leading to a more efficient allocation
of resources—in particular, to more lending and investment with higher profile, and more firm
growth—and thus higher welfare.
There are several avenues for future research. One line of inquiry is to explore whether
the provision of more information and a role for reputation can make preordered service even
more effective. As the cost upon enforcement was very small in our experiment, one may
ask whether higher costs, maybe due to large fines, can further improve the performance.
Similarly, one may ask what the effect of a cost associated with filing a court case is. Beyond
the laboratory, we think of our findings as suggestive that preordered service should be assessed
in a field experiment, which may also be informative as to how to best implement it.
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This Appendix contains proofs for all propositions in the main text (Section A), addi-
tional econometric analysis (Section B), as well as instruction sets and screenshots for the
experimental interface (Section C).
A Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the investment game between an investor and an entrepreneur without en-
forcement, i.e., p = 0. There are four possible strategy profiles: (Not Enter, Honor) associated
with payoffs (1, 1); (Not Enter, Not Honor) associated with payoffs (1, 1); (Enter, Honor) as-
sociated with payoffs (w,w); and (Enter, Not Honor) associated with payoffs (0, 2w). (Not
Enter, Honor) is not an equilibrium because the investor can profitably deviate to Enter,
increasing their payoff from 1 to w > 1. (Enter, Honor) is not an equilibrium because the
entrepreneur can profitably deviate to Not Honor, increasing their payoff from w to 2w > w.
(Enter, Not Honor) is not an equilibrium because the investor can profitably deviate to Not
Enter, increasing their payoff from 0 to 1 > 0. Finally, the profile (Not Enter, Not Honor) is
the unique equilibrium of this investment game: for the investor, deviating to Enter decreases
their payoff from 1 to 0 < 1 and is thus not profitable; for the entrepreneur, deviating to
Honor leaves their payoff of 1 unchanged and is thus not profitable. Because the argument is
the same for all investment games, the unique equilibrium in society is autarky. 
Proposition 2
Proof. First, consider the strategy profile in which all investors enter the contract and all
entrepreneurs honor the contract if they have one. All investors and entrepreneurs have
payoff w. For entrepreneurs, deviating to not honoring the contract implies that the resulting
claim is the only court case and thus first in line for enforcement and enforced with certainty,
implying payoff w− c < w. That is, entrepreneurs cannot profitably deviate. For investors,
deviating to not entering the contract implies payoff 1 < w and is thus not profitable. That
is, investors cannot profitably deviate. Thus, this strategy profile is an efficient equilibrium.
Second, consider any strategy profile in which bwc < n investors enter the contract while
the other n−bwc investors do not, and all entrepreneurs breach the contract if they have one.
As all bwc ≥ 2 entered contracts are breached, the number of claims filed with the courts is
x = bwc ≥ 2, implying that p = 1/x = 1/bwc ≤ 1/2. The expected payoff of entrepreneurs
who have a contract from not honoring it is
p(w− c) + (1− p)2w = 2w− p(w+ c).
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Their payoff from deviating to honoring the contract is w. Doing so is not profitable because
w < 2w− p(w+ c) ⇔ p < w
w+ c
,






That is, entrepreneurs who have a contract cannot profitably deviate to honoring it. En-
trepreneurs who do not have a contract cannot profitably deviate as their strategy does not
affect payoffs. Thus, no entrepreneur can profitably deviate. As all entered contracts are
breached, the expected payoff of investors who enter the contract is pw = w/bwc ≥ 1. Their
payoff from deviating to not entering the contract is 1. Thus, investors who enter the contract
cannot profitably deviate to not entering it. The payoff of all investors who do not enter the
contract is 1. For them, deviating to entering the contract is not profitable because doing
so implies that the contract is breached, that the number of claims filed with the courts is
x′ = bwc+ 1, and that their expected payoff is p′w = w/x′ = w/(bwc+ 1) < 1. Thus, no
investor can profitably deviate. That is, any such strategy profile is an equilibrium, and it is
inefficient due to less than maximum aggregate output and consumption. 
Proposition 3
Proof. The proof essentially proceeds by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Consider pair z1. The investor’s payoff from not entering the contract is 1. Irrespective
of the strategy of the entrepreneur in pair z1 and the strategies played in all other pairs,
the investor’s payoff from entering the contract is w > 1 as the contract is either honored or
enforced with certainty in case of breach because it is first in line for enforcement, irrespective
of the strategies played in all other pairs. Thus, the investor in pair z1 enters the contract,
irrespective of the strategies of all other agents in the economy. Given that the investor enters
the contract, the entrepreneur’s payoff from breaching the contract is w− c as the associated
court case is first in line for enforcement and thus enforced with certainty, irrespective of the
strategies played in all other pairs. Their payoff from honoring the contract is w > w − c.
Thus, the contract in pair z1 is entered and honored, irrespective of the strategies played in
all other pairs.
Let k ≥ 1, k ≤ n− 1, and assume that the contract is entered and honored in all pairs zi,
i ∈ I, i ≤ k. Consider pair zk+1. A potential breached contract in pair zk+1 would be first
in line and thus enforced with certainty, irrespective of the strategies played in all pairs zi,
i > k+ 1, if any. The investor’s payoff from not entering the contract is 1. Irrespective of the
strategy of the entrepreneur in pair zk+1, the investor’s payoff from entering the contract is
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w > 1 as the contract is either honored or enforced with certainty in case of breach. Thus,
the investor in pair zk+1 enters the contract, irrespective of the strategy of the entrepreneur
in pair zk+1 and the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k+ 1, if any. Given that the investor
enters the contract, the entrepreneur’s payoff from breaching the contract is w − c as it is
enforced with certainty, irrespective of the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any.
Their payoff from honoring the contract is w > w − c. Thus, the contract in pair zk+1 is
entered and honored, irrespective of the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k+ 1, if any.
Therefore, as the contract in pair z1 is entered and honored, it follows from iterating the
argument in the last paragraph above from k = 1 to k = n− 1 that all n contracts are entered
and honored, which thus is the unique equilibrium. 
Lemma 1
Proof. If the equilibrium strategy profile is such that at most one investor enters the contract,
then trivially either all entrepreneurs who have a contract breach it if they have a choice, or all
entrepreneurs who have a contract honor it if they have a choice. Suppose for a contradiction
that in some equilibrium, the strategy profile is such that k∗ > 1 investors enter the contract
and k̂ > 0 of those entrepreneurs who have a contract breach it if they have a choice while
k∗ − k̂ > 0 of those entrepreneurs who have a contract honor it if they have a choice. Then,
a number k̂ of contracts are breached with certainty. The other k∗ − k̂ contracts may or may
not be breached exogenously. There are (k
∗−k̂
k ) distinct cases of exactly k of those k∗ − k̂
contracts being breached exogenously, each one occurring with probability (1− α)kαk∗−k̂−k.
In each of these cases, each breached contract is first in line for service at the courts with
probability 1/(k̂ + k). Thus, the probability of being first in line for service at the courts











As some entrepreneurs breach the contract if they have a choice it must be the case that
p(w− c) + (1− p)2w = 2w− p(w+ c) ≥ w,(3)
otherwise they could profitably deviate to honoring the contract if they have a choice. Consider
an entrepreneur who has a contract and honors it if they have a choice. If they deviated to
breaching the contract if they have a choice, then k̂ + 1 contracts would be breached with
certainty while k∗ − k̂− 1 ≥ 0 contracts may or may not be breached exogenously.
If k∗ − k̂ − 1 = 0, then now all k∗ entered contracts are breached with certainty and the
new probability of a breached contract to be first in line is p′ = 1/(k̂+ 1) = 1/k∗. From (2)
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(1− α)kαk∗−k̂−k = 1
k∗
(1− α+ α)k∗−k̂ = 1
k∗
= p′,
where the first equality derives from the Binomial Theorem. That is, if k∗ − k̂− 1 = 0, then
the new probability of being first in line for service at the courts upon breaching one’s contract
is p′ < p.
Suppose that k∗ − k̂ − 1 > 0. Then, there are (k
∗−k̂−1
k ) distinct cases of exactly k of
those k∗ − k̂ − 1 contracts being breached exogenously, each one occurring with probability
(1− α)kαk∗−k̂−1−k. In each of these cases, each breached contract is first in line for service
at the courts with probability 1/(k̂+ 1 + k). Thus, the new probability of being first in line






























with k = l.
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k̂+ 1 + k
,
where the last equality follows from (4). The term multiplied by (1− α) is p′ given in (4),
and it is strictly smaller than the term multiplied by α as 1/(k̂ + k) > 1/(k̂ + 1 + k) for all
k ≥ 0. Thus, p is a convex combination of p′ and a term that is strictly greater than p′. Thus,
if k∗− k̂− 1 > 0, then p′ < p as well. Thus, by (3), the expected payoff from this deviation is
2w− p′(w+ c) > 2w− p(w+ c) ≥ w.
That is, entrepreneurs that have a contract and honor it if they have a choice can profitably
deviate to breaching it if they have a choice, a contradiction. 
Proposition 4
Proof. Consider any strategy profile in which exactly k̂ > 1, k̂ ≤ n, investors enter the
contract, while the other n− k̂ investor do not enter the contract, and all entrepreneurs honor
the contract if they have one and have a choice. Entrepreneurs that do not have a contract
cannot profitably deviate. Consider the entrepreneur in any pair that has entered the contract.
In the case in which they have a choice whether or not to honor the contract, they honor it
and get payoff w. Suppose that this entrepreneur deviates to breaching the contract if they
have a choice. Then, their contract is breached with certainty. All other k̂ − 1 contracts
may or may not be breached exogenously. There are (k̂−1k ) distinct cases of exactly k of
those k̂− 1 other contracts being breached exogenously, each one occurring with probability
(1−α)kαk̂−1−k. In each of these cases, each breached contract is first in line for service at the
courts with probability 1/(k + 1). Thus, if they have a choice, this entrepreneur’s expected
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payoff associated with deviating to breaching the contract is
p(w− c) + (1− p)2w = 2w− p(w+ c),








































































This deviation to breaching the contract if they have a choice is not profitable if and only if









That is, the entrepreneur cannot profitably deviate to breaching the contract if they have a
choice if and only if (6) is satisfied.
Consider the investor in this pair. Suppose that (6) is satisfied. Although the strategy
profile under consideration prescribes that the entrepreneur honors the contract if they have
a choice, the investor still faces a probability 1− α ∈ (0, 1) of their contract being breached
exogenously. In this case, the associated court case will be first in line for service with
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probability p as given by (5). Their expected payoff from entering the contract is
αw+ (1− α)[pw+ (1− p) · 0] = [α+ (1− α)p]w = [α · 1 + (1− α) · p]w ≥ pw.






⇒ pw > 1.
That is, as the payoff from not entering the contract is 1, this investor cannot profitably
deviate to not entering the contract.
In the case that k̂ < n, consider any investor that has not entered the contract. Their
payoff is 1. Suppose they were to deviate to entering the contract. Although the strategy
profile under consideration prescribes that the entrepreneur honors the contract if they have
one and have a choice, the investor still faces a probability 1− α ∈ (0, 1) of their contract
being breached exogenously. In this case, the associated court case will be first in line for





Their expected payoff from deviating to entering the contract is
αw+ (1− α)[p′w+ (1− p′) · 0] = [α+ (1− α)p′]w.
Using (7), this deviation is not profitable if and only if
[α+ (1− α)p′]w ≤ 1






Therefore, in the case that k̂ < n, no individual can profitably deviate so that the strategy
profile under consideration is an equilibrium if and only if k̂ satisfies (6) and (8).
In the case that k̂ = n, there are no investors that have not entered their contract. It
follows that, in the case that k̂ = n, no individual can profitably deviate so that the strategy
profile under consideration is an equilibrium if and only if k̂ satisfies (6).


















and as w/(w+ c) < 1, (6) holds as a strict inequality. Thus, by continuity, for large enough
α < 1, (6) holds as well. Therefore, in the case that k̂ = n, for high enough α, no individual
can profitably deviate so that the strategy profile under consideration is an equilibrium. 
Proposition 5
Proof. First, consider any strategy profile in which exactly bwc investors enter the contract
and all entrepreneurs breach the contract if they have one and have a choice. That is, all bwc
contracts that are entered are breached with certainty. The number of claims filed with the
courts is x = bwc. For every one of the associated court cases, the probability of arriving first
in line for enforcement is p = 1/x = 1/bwc. Given that w ≥ 2, so that bwc ≥ 2, and w > c,







⇔ 2w− p(w+ c) > w.
That is, entrepreneurs who have a contract cannot profitably deviate to honoring it if they have
a choice. Entrepreneurs who do not have a contract cannot profitably deviate because their
strategy does not affect payoffs. As their contract is breached with certainty, the expected
payoff of investors who enter the contract is pw = w/bwc ≥ 1, implying that they cannot
profitably deviate to not entering the contract, which would give them payoff 1. The payoff
of investors who do not enter the contract is 1. If they deviated to entering the contract, then
the associated entrepreneur breaches it if they have a choice so that the contract is breached
with certainty, the number of cases filed with the courts is x′ = x+ 1 = bwc+ 1, and the
probability of enforcement of the contract is p′ = 1/x′ = 1/(bwc + 1). Thus, for these
investors, deviating to entering the contract yields expected payoff p′w = w/(bwc+ 1) < 1
and is thus not profitable. Hence, the profile considered is an equilibrium.
Second, suppose for a contradiction that in some equilibrium, the strategy profile is such
that k̂ > bwc investors enter the contract and all entrepreneurs breach the contract if they
have one and have a choice. That is, all k̂ ≥ bwc+ 1 contracts that are entered are breached
with certainty. The number of filed cases with the courts is x = k̂ and the probability of
enforcement is p = 1/x = 1/k̂ ≤ 1/(bwc + 1). That is, the expected payoff of those k̂
investors who enter the contract is pw = w/k̂ ≤ w/(bwc+ 1) < 1. Thus, these investors can
profitably deviate to not entering the contract, yielding payoff 1, a contradiction. 
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Proposition 6









We first show in Step 1 that irrespective of what the pairs zj , j > k∗, do, for all i ≤ k∗, the
investor in pair zi optimally enters the contract and the associated entrepreneur optimally
honors the contract if they have a choice, except possibly the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ in the
case of indifference. For the case of k∗ ≥ n, the result thus obtains: an equilibrium exists, and
in equilibrium the investors in all n pairs enter the contract and all entrepreneurs honor it if
they have a choice, except possibly the one in pair zn. We then consider the case in which
k∗ < n. We show in Step 2 that in every equilibrium, at most one entrepreneur who has a
contract breaches their contract if they have a choice. We then show in Step 3 that in every
equilibrium, if the entrepreneur in pair zk has a contract and breaches it if they have a choice,
then no pair zi, i > k, enters the contract. Next, we show in Step 4 that in every equilibrium,
either k∗ or k∗ + 1 contracts are entered. Finally, in Step 5, we consider a specific profile
and show that it is an equilibrium, thereby establishing that an equilibrium exists if k∗ < n,
and thus in general.
Step 1. For all i ≤ k∗, the investor in pair zi optimally enters the contract and the
associated entrepreneur optimally honors the contract if they have a choice, except possibly
that in pair zk∗ in the case of indifference, irrespective of what the pairs zj, j > k∗, do.
Step 1a. Consider pair z1. The investor’s payoff from not entering the contract is 1.
Irrespective of the strategy of the entrepreneur in pair z1 and the strategies played in all
other pairs, the investor’s payoff from entering the contract is w > 1 as the contract is either
honored or enforced with certainty in case of breach, be it exogenous or deliberate, because
their contract would be first in line for enforcement. Thus, the investor in pair z1 optimally
enters the contract, irrespective of the strategies of all other agents in the economy. Given
that the investor enters the contract, the entrepreneur’s payoff from breaching the contract if
they have a choice is w− c as the associated court case is first in line for enforcement and thus
enforced with certainty, irrespective of the strategies played in all other pairs. Their payoff
from honoring the contract if they have a choice is w > w− c. Thus, the contract in pair z1
is optimally entered and optimally honored if there is a choice, irrespective of the strategies
played in all other pairs. Step 1 ends here if k∗ = 1.
Step 1b. Suppose that k∗ ≥ 2. Let k ∈ I, k ≥ 1, k ≤ k∗− 1, and assume that in all pairs
zi, i ∈ I, i ≤ k, the contract is entered and honored if there is a choice. The definition of k∗
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Consider pair zk+1. The investor’s payoff from not entering the contract is 1. Suppose they
were to enter the contract. Then, the entrepreneur, if they have a choice, can either breach
the contract or honor the contract. If they breach the contract if they have a choice, then
the contract in pair zk+1 is breached with certainty. The associated court case will be first
in line for service if and only if none of the k entrepreneurs in a pair zi, i ≤ k, had their
contract breached exogenously. The probability of this outcome is αk, in which case the
investor’s payoff is w. With probability 1− αk, at least one of those k contracts is breached
exogenously, in which case the breached contract of pair zk+1 is not enforced, yielding payoff
0 for the investor. That is, if the entrepreneur breaches the contract if they have a choice,
then the investor’s expected payoff from entering the contract is
αkw+ (1− αk) · 0 = αkw.
If the entrepreneur honors the contract if they have a choice, then the investor in pair zk+1
still faces a positive probability 1− α ∈ (0, 1) of their contract being breached exogenously.
In this case, the associated court case will be first in line for service if and only if none
of the k entrepreneurs in a pair zi, i ≤ k, had their contract breached exogenously. The
probability of this outcome is αk, in which case the investor’s payoff is w. With probability
1−αk, at least one of those k contracts is breached exogenously, in which case the exogenously
breached contract of pair zk+1 is not enforced, yielding payoff 0 for the investor. That is, if
the entrepreneur honors the contract if they have a choice, then the investor’s expected payoff
from entering the contract is
αw+ (1− α)[αkw+ (1− αk) · 0] = [α+ (1− α)αk]w = [α · 1 + (1− α)αk]w > αkw.
That is, irrespective of the strategy of the entrepreneur in pair zk+1 and the strategies played
in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any, the investor’s expected payoff from entering the contract is
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because w ≥ 2 and w > c so that w2 ≥ 2w > w + c. Thus, irrespective of the strategy of
the entrepreneur in pair zk+1 and the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any, the
investor’s expected payoff from entering the contract is strictly greater than that from not
entering it. Therefore, the contract in pair zk+1 is optimally entered.
Given that the contract is entered in pair zk+1, if the entrepreneur has a choice, then
their payoff from honoring the contract is w. If they were to breach the contract, then the
associated court case will be first in line for service if and only if none of the k entrepreneurs
in a pair zi, i ≤ k, had their contract breached exogenously. The probability of this outcome
is αk, in which case the entrepreneur’s payoff from breaching the contract if they have a choice
is w− c. With probability 1− αk, at least one of those k contracts is breached exogenously,
in which case the breached contract of pair zk+1 is not enforced, yielding payoff 2w for the
entrepreneur. That is, irrespective of the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any,
the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from not honoring the contract if they have a choice is
αk(w− c) + (1− αk)2w = 2w− αk(w+ c).
Then, from (11)–(12),
w > 2w− αk(w+ c) ⇔ αk > w
w+ c
∀k ∈ I, k ≥ 1, k < k∗ − 1,(13)
w ≥ 2w− αk∗−1(w+ c) ⇔ αk∗−1 ≥ w
w+ c
.(14)
Thus, if k < k∗− 1, if they have a choice, then by (13) the entrepreneur’s payoff from honoring
the contract is strictly greater than their expected payoff from not honoring it, irrespective
of the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k+ 1, if any. That is, irrespective of the strategies
played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any, the contract in pair zk+1 is optimally entered and
optimally honored if there is a choice. If k = k∗ − 1 and αk∗−1 > w/(w+ c), then (14) holds
as a strict inequality so that, if they have a choice, the entrepreneur’s payoff from honoring
the contract is strictly greater than their expected payoff from not honoring it, irrespective
of the strategies played in all pairs zi, i > k+ 1, if any. That is, irrespective of the strategies
played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any, the contract in pair zk+1 = zk∗ is optimally entered
and optimally honored if there is a choice. If k = k∗ − 1 and αk∗−1 = w/(w+ c), then (14)
holds as an equality so that, if they have a choice, the entrepreneur’s payoff from honoring the
contract is equal to their expected payoff from not honoring it, irrespective of the strategies
played in all pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any. That is, irrespective of the strategies played in all
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pairs zi, i > k + 1, if any, the contract in pair zk+1 = zk∗ is optimally entered and may or
may not be honored if there is a choice.
Step 1c. Because the contract in pair z1 is optimally entered and optimally honored if
there is a choice, it follows from iterating the argument in Step 1b above from k = 1 to
k = k∗ − 1 that in all pairs zi, i ∈ I, i ≤ k∗, the investor optimally enters the contract; and
that the entrepreneur optimally honors the contract if they have a choice in at least all pairs
zi, i ∈ I, i ≤ k∗ − 1. Unless the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ is indifferent, they optimally honor
the contract if they have a choice as well. If the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ is indifferent, then
they may or may not honor the contract if they have a choice.
If k∗ ≥ n, then it follows by the argument in Step 1 above that an equilibrium exists, and
that the investors in all n pairs enter the contract and all entrepreneurs honor it if they have
a choice, except possibly the entrepreneur in pair zn if k∗ = n, in the case of indifference.
Now, suppose that k∗ < n.
Step 2. In every equilibrium, at most one entrepreneur who has a contract breaches their
contract if they have a choice.
Suppose for a contradiction that in some equilibrium, at least two entrepreneurs who have
a contract breach their contract if they have a choice. That is, there exist i, j ∈ I such that
the investors in pairs zi and zj enter the contract and the associated entrepreneurs breach it
if they have a choice. That is, both contracts are breached with certainty. Without loss of
generality, assume that i < j, i.e., the court case associated with pair zi’s breached contract
precedes that associated with pair zj ’s breached contract at the courts. It follows that the
breached contract of pair zj goes unenforced with certainty. Thus, the expected payoff from
entering the contract for the investor in pair zj is 0. Deviating to not entering the contract
yields sure payoff 1 and is thus profitable, a contradiction. Therefore, in every equilibrium,
at most one entrepreneur who has a contract breaches their contract if they have a choice.
Step 3. In every equilibrium, if the entrepreneur in pair zk has a contract and breaches
it if they have a choice, then no pair zi, i > k, enters the contract.
If k = n, then the result holds trivially. Suppose that k < n. Suppose for a contradiction
that in some equilibrium, for some k, j ∈ I, j > k, the entrepreneur in pair zk has a contract
and breaches it if they have a choice and the investor in pair zj enters the contract. There
are two possibilities: either (i) the entrepreneur in pair zj breaches the contract if they have
a choice, or (ii) the entrepreneur in pair zj honors the contract if they have a choice.
Case (i). Suppose that the entrepreneur in pair zj breaches the contract if they have a
choice. Then, at least two entrepreneurs who have a contract breach their contract if they
have a choice, which contradicts the statement proven in Step 2.
Case (ii). Suppose that the entrepreneur in pair zj honors the contract if they have a
choice. As the contract in pair zk is breached with certainty, a potentially breached contract
in pair zj goes unenforced with certainty, because the court case associated with pair zk’s
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breached contract precedes that associated with pair zj ’s breached contract at the courts.
That is, for the entrepreneur in pair zj , while the sure payoff from honoring the contract if
they have a choice is w, the sure payoff from breaching it if they have a choice is 2w > w.
That is, the entrepreneur in pair zj can profitably deviate to breaching the contract if they
have a choice, a contradiction.
Therefore, in every equilibrium, if the entrepreneur in pair zk has a contract and breaches
it if they have a choice, then no pair zi, i > k, enters the contract.
Step 4. In every equilibrium, either k∗ or k∗ + 1 contracts are entered.
It follows from Step 1 that in equilibrium, for all i ≤ k∗, the investor in pair zi enters the
contract. That is, at least k∗ contracts are entered. Because for any integer k∗













 ≥ k∗ + 1 > k∗,
it follows from the definition of k∗ in (10) that



























Again from Step 1, there are two possible cases: either (i) the entrepreneur in pair zk∗
breaches the contract if they have a choice (in the case of indifference), or (ii) the entrepreneur
in pair zk∗ honors the contract if they have a choice. Consider each case in turn.
Case (i). Suppose that the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ breaches the contract if they have a
choice. It then follows from Step 3 that in equilibrium, for all i > k∗, the investor in pair zi
does not enter the contract. That is, exactly k∗ contracts are entered.
Case (ii). Suppose that the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ honors the contract if they have a
choice. Suppose that in some equilibrium, at least k∗ + 1 contracts are entered. Let j be the
minimum index k such that k > k∗ and the investor in pair zk enters the contract. If the
entrepreneur in pair zj has a choice, then their payoff from honoring the contract is w. If
they were to breach the contract, then the associated court case will be first in line for service
if and only if none of the k∗ entrepreneurs in pairs zi, i ≤ k∗, had their contract breached
exogenously. The probability of this outcome is αk∗ , in which case the entrepreneur’s payoff
is w− c. With probability 1−αk∗ , at least one of those k∗ contracts is breached exogenously,
in which case the breached contract of pair zj is not enforced, yielding payoff 2w for the
entrepreneur. That is, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from not honoring the contract if
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they have a choice is
αk
∗
(w− c) + (1− αk∗)2w = 2w− αk∗(w+ c).
By (15), in this equilibrium, the entrepreneur in pair zj breaches the contract if they have a
choice because




It then follows from Step 3 that in this equilibrium with at least k∗ + 1 entered contracts it
must be the case that for all i > j, the investor in pair zi does not enter the contract. That
is, exactly k∗ + 1 contracts are entered in this equilibrium.
Step 5. The strategy profile in which the investors in all pairs zi, i ∈ I, i ≤ k∗, enter
the contract, the investor in pair zk∗+1 enters the contract if and only if αk
∗
w ≥ 1, and
the investors in all pairs zi, i ∈ I, i > k∗ + 1, if any, do not enter the contract while the
entrepreneurs in all pairs zi, i ∈ I, i ≤ k∗, honor the contract if they have one and have a
choice and the entrepreneurs in all pairs zi, i ∈ I, i > k∗ breach the contract if they have one
and have a choice is an equilibrium. (That is, an equilibrium exists also when k∗ < n, and
thus in general.)
Consider the described strategy profile. Following Step 1, for all i ≤ k∗, the investor in
pair zi optimally enters the contract and the associated entrepreneur optimally honors the
contract if they have a choice, except possibly that in pair zk∗ in the case of indifference,
irrespective of what the pairs zi, i > k∗, do. That is, no investor or entrepreneur in any pair
zi, i ≤ k∗, can profitably deviate.
Consider pair zk∗+1. The strategy profile prescribes that the investor in pair zk∗+1 may
or may not enter the contract while the entrepreneur in pair zk∗+1 breaches the contract if
they have one and have a choice. Consider the entrepreneur. If the investor does not enter
the contract, then for the entrepreneur, deviating to honoring the contract if they have one
and have a choice does not affect the payoffs and is thus not profitable. If the investor enters
the contract and they have a choice, then their payoff from honoring the contract is w. As
they breach the contract if they have a choice, the contract in pair zk∗+1 is breached with
certainty. Because the entrepreneur in pair zk∗ honors the contract if they have a choice, the
court case associated with the breached contract in pair zk∗+1 will be first in line for service
if and only if none of the k∗ entrepreneurs in a pair zi, i ≤ k∗, had their contract breached
exogenously. The probability of this outcome is αk∗ , in which case the entrepreneur’s payoff
is w− c. With probability 1−αk∗ , at least one of those k∗ contracts is breached exogenously,
in which case the breached contract of pair zk∗+1 is not enforced, yielding payoff 2w for the
entrepreneur. That is, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from not honoring the contract if
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they have a choice is
αk
∗




which holds by (15), so that this entrepreneur optimally breaches the contract if they have
one and have a choice and thus cannot profitably deviate from the prescribed strategy.
Consider the investor in pair zk∗+1. The strategy profile prescribes that they enter the
contract if αk∗w ≥ 1 and do not enter the contract if αk∗w < 1. Their payoff from not entering
the contract is 1. Suppose that they enter the contract. As prescribed by the strategy profile,
the entrepreneur in pair zk∗+1 breaches the contract if they have one and have a choice so that
the contract is breached with certainty. The associated court case will be first in line for service
if and only if none of the k∗ entrepreneurs in a pair zi, i ≤ k∗, had their contract breached
exogenously. The probability of this outcome is αk∗ , in which case the investor’s payoff is w.
With probability 1−αk∗ , at least one of those k∗ contracts is breached exogenously, in which
case the breached contract of pair zk∗+1 is not enforced, yielding payoff 0 for the investor.
That is, the investor’s expected payoff from entering the contract is
αk
∗
w+ (1− αk∗) · 0 = αk∗w.
Thus, if αk∗w ≥ 1, then the investor in pair zk∗+1 cannot profitably deviate to not entering
the contract; if αk∗w < 1, then the investor in pair zk∗+1 cannot profitably deviate to entering
the contract.
Consider any pair zk, k > k∗ + 1, if any. With the prescribed strategy profile, both
the investor and the entrepreneur have sure payoff 1. As the investor does not enter the
contract, for the entrepreneur, deviating to honoring the contract if they have one and have a
choice does not affect the payoffs and is thus not profitable. As the entrepreneur breaches the
contract if they have one and have a choice, a potential contract is breached with certainty.
There are two cases: either (i) αk∗w ≥ 1, or (ii) αk∗w < 1. Consider each case in turn.
Case (i). Suppose that αk∗w ≥ 1. Then, the investor in pair zk∗+1 enters the contract,
which is breached by the entrepreneur in pair zk∗+1 if they have a choice and thus is breached
with certainty. Therefore, a potential contract in pair zk, which would be breached with
certainty, would go unenforced with certainty as well. Thus, for the investor in pair zk,
deviating to entering the contract implies sure payoff 0. That is, if αk∗w ≥ 1, then the
investor in pair zk cannot profitably deviate to entering the contract.
Case (ii). Suppose that αk∗w < 1. Then, the investor in pair zk∗+1 does not enter the
contract. In addition, the strategy profile prescribes that the investors in all pairs zj , j ∈ I,
j > k∗ + 1, j 6= k, if any, also do not enter the contract. Suppose that the investor in pair zk
were to deviate to entering the contract. The entrepreneur in pair zk breaches the contract if
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they have a choice so that the contract is breached with certainty. The associated court case
will be first in line for service if and only if none of the k∗ entrepreneurs in a pair zi, i ≤ k∗,
had their contract breached exogenously. The probability of this outcome is αk∗ , in which
case the investor’s payoff is w. With probability 1−αk∗ , at least one of those k∗ contracts is
breached exogenously, in which case the breached contract of pair zk is not enforced, yielding
payoff 0 for the investor. That is, the investor’s expected payoff from entering the contract is
αk
∗
w+ (1− αk∗) · 0 = αk∗w < 1.
That is, if αk∗w < 1, then the investor in pair zk cannot profitably deviate to entering the
contract.
Thus, the described strategy profile is an equilibrium. It follows that an equilibrium exists
also if k∗ < n. Therefore, an equilibrium exists in general, which completes the proof. 
Proposition 7
Proof. With sequential service, by Proposition 5, the number of contracts entered is bwc.















































As n > w ≥ bwc, it follows that min{k∗, k∗ + 1,n} ≥ bwc. Therefore, in any case, (weakly)
more contracts are entered with preordered service than with sequential service. 
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Proposition 8
Proof. With sequential service, by Proposition 5, the expected caseload equals the number
of entered contracts, bwc. With preordered service, by Proposition 6, either k∗, k∗ + 1, or n
contracts are entered, and at most one entrepreneur with a contract breaches it if they have
a choice. Let k̂ be the number of contracts entered with preordered service. There are two
cases: either (1) all k̂ contracts are honored if the entrepreneur has a choice; or (2) exactly
one entrepreneur with a contract breaches it if they have a choice while the remaining k̂− 1
contracts are honored if the entrepreneur has a choice. Consider each case in turn.
Case (1). Suppose that all k̂ contracts are honored if the entrepreneur has a choice.
All k̂ contracts may or may not be breached exogenously. Therefore, the number of breached
contracts follows a binomial distribution with parameters k̂ and (1−α). The expected number
of breached contracts with preordered service thus is (1− α)k̂ in this case.
Case (2). Suppose that exactly one entrepreneur with a contract breaches it if they have
a choice while the remaining k̂ − 1 contracts are honored if the entrepreneur has a choice.
That is, exactly one of the k̂ contracts is breached with certainty while all of the remaining
k̂− 1 contracts may or may not be breached exogenously. Therefore, the number of breached
contracts among the remaining k̂−1 contracts follows a binomial distribution with parameters
k̂− 1 and (1− α). The expected number of breached contracts with preordered service thus
is (1− α)(k̂− 1) + 1 in this case.
As (1− α)k̂ < (1− α)(k̂ − 1) + 1 because α > 0, it follows that the expected caseload
at the courts is (weakly) lower with preordered service than with sequential service if (1−
α)(k̂− 1) + 1 ≤ bwc, or k̂ ≤ (bwc − α)/(1− α). 
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Table B1: Estimated Linear Time Trends in Caseload, Compliance, and Investment
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Caseload Compliance Investment
PreOrder -0.879∗∗∗ (0.244) 0.048 (0.097) -0.025 (0.090)
SeqServe -0.108 (0.105) 0.053 (0.104)
PreOrder × Round -0.035∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.019∗∗∗ (0.005)
SeqServe × Round 0.012∗∗ (0.005) 0.009∗ (0.005)
Round -0.029∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.019∗∗∗ (0.004)
Constant 3.179∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.489∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.625∗∗∗ (0.082)
N 240 357† 360
R2 0.266 0.297 0.250
Economy-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
†: 3 missing observations correspond to zero investment in those rounds.
B Additional Econometric Analysis
Table B1 reports Random Effects regressions of y ∈ {Caseload,Compliance, Investment} on
a linear time trend for each of the three treatments, using as the unit of observation the
average y across all six economies in a given experimental round. In the Caseload regression,
we exclude the data from None; the omitted treatment is SeqServe. The Compliance and
Investment regressions include data from the three treatments.
In the Caseload regression, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Round, in-
dicating declining caseload levels over time in SeqServe. The coefficient on PreOrder ×
Round is negative and highly significant, indicating a faster rate of decline in caseload in
PreOrder than SeqServe.
In the Compliance regression, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Round,
indicating declining compliance levels over time in None. The coefficient on PreOrder
× Round is positive and highly significant; furthermore, Round + PreOrder × Round
is positive and significantly different from zero (F (1, 17) = 24.76, p < 0.001), indicating a
positive time trend in compliance in PreOrder. The coefficient on SeqServe × Round is
also positive and highly significant; however, Round + SeqServe × Round is negative and
not significantly different from zero (F (1, 17) = 1.85, p = 0.191), indicating a flat time trend
in compliance in SeqServe.
In the Investment regression, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Round,
indicating declining investment levels over time in None. The coefficient on PreOrder
× Round is positive and highly significant; furthermore, Round + PreOrder × Round is
positive and not significantly different from zero (F (1, 17) = 0.00, p = 0.949), indicating
a flat time trend in investment in PreOrder. The coefficient on SeqServe × Round is
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Table B2: Estimated Determinants of Investment and Compliance Conditional on Labels
DV: Compliance Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A-Label 0.073∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.099 0.110
(0.029) (0.031) (0.082) (0.081)
A-Label × SeqServe -0.078∗ -0.062 -0.119 -0.125
(0.043) (0.046) (0.093) (0.095)
A-Label × PreOrder 0.486∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.093) (0.101) (0.111)
Round -0.054∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014)
Round × SeqServe 0.037∗ 0.022 0.032∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019)
Round × PreOrder 0.099∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028)
DNRCt−1 -0.037 -0.146∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.028)
DNRCt−1 × SeqServe -0.010 0.023
(0.068) (0.047)
DNRCt−1 × PreOrder -0.019 -0.021
(0.089) (0.086)
SeqServe -0.052 0.125 0.696 0.738
(0.334) (0.459) (0.442) (0.571)
PreOrder -2.547∗∗∗ -2.513∗∗∗ -1.974∗∗∗ -1.926∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.779) (0.422) (0.630)
Constant -0.337∗∗ -0.418 0.009 0.235
(0.212) (0.359) (0.293) (0.380)
LL -760.8 -700.1 -1,438.6 -1,346.0
N (obs, individuals) (1,539, 144) (1,436, 144) (2,880, 144) (2,736, 144)
Economy-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
also positive and highly significant; however, Round + SeqServe × Round is negative and
significantly different from zero (F (1, 17) = 12.15, p = 0.003), indicating a negative time
trend in compliance in SeqServe.
Table B2 reports Random Effects Probit regressions of y ∈ {Compliance, Investment} on
investor labels, a linear time trend (Round), and, in a second specification (regressions 2 and
4), a variable counting how many entrepreneurs did not honor the contract in the previous
round (DNRCt−1), as well as dummy interactions of all the above with treatment dummies
for SeqServe and PreOrder.
We start by looking at the Compliance regressions. In regression (1), the coefficient on
A-Label is positive and significant, although small in magnitude, indicating that compli-
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ance levels in None increased in investor label. The interaction with SeqServe is negative
and significant, and (A-Label + A-Label × SeqServe) is not significantly different from
zero (χ2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.882), indicating no relationship between label and compliance in
SeqServe. In contrast, (A-Label × PreOrder) is large, positive and highly significant,
indicating a positive relationship between label and compliance in PreOrder. We also find
a negative and significant time trend in None; the interaction of Round with SeqServe
is positive and marginally significant; (Round + Round × SeqServe) is not significantly
different from zero (χ2(1) = 1.57, p = 0.211); the interaction of Round with PreOrder is
positive and significant; (Round + Round × PreOrder) is significantly different from zero
(χ2(1) = 5.38, p = 0.020) indicating a positive time trend in compliance. The same results
hold in regression (2) which includes DNRCt−1, while the coefficients on that variable and
its treatment interactions are not significant.
We now turn to the Investment regressions. The coefficient on A-Label is not significantly
different from zero; likewise for A-Label × SeqServe, indicating no relationship between
investor labels and investment in None or SeqServe. In contrast, the coefficient on the
interaction between A-Label and PreOrder is positive and highly significant, indicating a
positive relationship between investment and labels. The coefficient on Round is negative and
significant, indicating a downward trend in investment in None; the coefficient on (Round ×
SeqServe) is positive and significant, although (Round + Round × SeqServe) is negative
and significantly different from zero (χ2(1) = 10.85, p = 0.001) indicating a downward trend
in investment over time in SeqServe. The coefficient on (Round × PreOrder) is also
positive and significant; furthermore (Round + Round × PreOrder) is equal to zero and not
statistically significant (χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.970) indicating stable investment levels over time
in PreOrder. These results hold in the specification that includesDNRCt−1. The coefficient
onDNRCt−1 is negative and significant, indicating that low compliance in the previous period
is negatively correlated with investment; this statistical relationship is consistent across the
three treatments, as per the non-significant interactions of DNRCt−1 with the two treatment
dummies.
Table B3 reports Random Effects Probit regressions of y ∈ {Compliance, Investment}. The
first specification—regressions (1) and (3)—includes as regressors a set of dummy variables
for different investor labels (label A1 is the omitted category), a linear time trend (Round),
as well as a variable counting how many entrepreneurs did not honor the contract in the
previous round (DNRCt−1), as well as dummy interactions of all the above with treatment
dummies for SeqServe and PreOrder. We observe in both Investment and Compliance
regressions a discernible pattern as we move down labels in PreOrder which is absent in
None and SeqServe. The coefficients on the time trends corroborate the earlier findings:
in the investment regression, we observe a negative and significant time trend in None.
The time trend in SeqServe is significantly different from the one in None but (Round
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Table B3: Estimated Determinants of Investment and Compliance Conditional on Labels,
Alternative Specification
DV: Investment Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A8 × SeqServe -1.328∗∗ (0.675) -0.936∗∗ (0.454)
A7 × SeqServe -0.944 (0.977) -0.505 (0.450)
A6 × SeqServe -1.178∗ (0.609) -0.465 (0.309)
A5 × SeqServe 0.005 (0.832) -0.876∗∗ (0.309)
A4 × SeqServe -0.307 (0.798) -0.867∗∗∗ (0.244)
A3 × SeqServe -0.732 (0.781) -0.700∗ (0.382)
A2 × SeqServe -0.926 (0.626) -0.425 (0.336)
SeqServe 0.865∗ (0.517) 0.180 (0.491) 0.436 (0.507) -0.117 (0.303)
Round × SeqServe 0.037∗ (0.019) 0.037∗ (0.019) 0.023 (0.024)
DNRCt−1 × SeqServe 0.022 (0.047) 0.023 (0.047) -0.005 (0.075)
A8 × PreOrder 0† (-) 0† (-) 8.781∗∗∗ (0.573) 9.149∗∗∗ (0.423)
A7 × PreOrder 2.071 (1.297) 3.115∗∗∗ (0.940) 8.591∗∗∗ (0.526) 8.824∗∗∗ (0.357)
A6 × PreOrder 2.151∗∗ (1.012) 2.786∗∗∗ (0.872) 8.135∗∗∗ (0.431) 8.193∗∗∗ (0.392)
A5 × PreOrder 2.440∗∗∗ (0.668) 3.062∗∗∗ (0.461) 6.959∗∗∗ (0.429) 7.636∗∗∗ (0.385)
A4 × PreOrder 1.731∗∗ (0.764) 1.992∗∗∗ (0.421) 6.226∗∗∗ (0.400) 6.682∗∗∗ (0.349)
A3 × PreOrder 0.573 (0.868) 1.207∗∗∗ (0.420) 5.967∗∗∗ (0.498) 6.233∗∗∗ (0.447)
A2 × PreOrder 0.368 (0.552) 0.859∗∗ (0.410) 6.420∗∗∗ (0.598) 6.586∗∗∗ (0.531)
PreOrder -1.343∗∗ (0.560) -1.908∗∗∗ (0.518) -7.137∗∗∗ (0.597) -6.712∗∗∗ (0.420)
Round × PreOrder 0.057∗∗ (0.028) 0.056∗∗ (0.028) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.030)
DNRCt−1 × PreOrder -0.023 (0.087) -0.024 (0.087) -0.028 (0.106)
A8 0.914 (0.586) 0.697∗ (0.361)
A7 1.018 (0.915) 0.514 (0.395)
A6 0.612 (0.567) 0.291 (0.230)
A5 0.602 (0.488) 0.856∗∗∗ (0.186)
A4 0.252 (0.640) 0.593∗∗∗ (0.180)
A3 0.630 (0.767) 0.496∗∗∗ (0.177)
A2 0.490 (0.378) 0.224 (0.278)
Round -0.066∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.066∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.039∗∗ (0.018)
DNRCt−1 -0.145∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.145∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.047 (0.071)
Constant 0.165 (0.425) 0.727∗∗ (0.363) -0.588 (0.396) -0.455∗ (0.247)
LL -1,339.5 -1,478.2 -690.8 -771.9
N (obs, subjects) (2,622, 138) (2,622, 138) (1,539, 144) 1,436, 144)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
†: A8 was dropped from estimation as L8 = 1 predicted success perfectly; 114 obs not used.
+ Round × SeqServe) is negative and significant (χ2(1) = 10.61, p = 0.001). The time
trend in PreOrder is significantly different from the one in None but (Round + Round ×
PreOrder) is essentially zero and not significant (χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.968).
In the compliance regression, we observe a negative and significant time trend in None.
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The time trend in SeqServe is not significantly different from the one in None (χ2(1) =
1.55, p = 0.213). The time trend in PreOrder is significantly different from the one in None
and (Round + Round × PreOrder) is positive and significant (χ2(1) = 5.71, p = 0.017).
In other words, we find a positive time trend in compliance in PreOrder, but a negative
time trend in None and SeqServe. The coefficient on DNRCt−1 is negative and significant
in the investment regression, indicating a negative correlation between past compliance and
current investment, while it is not significant in the compliance regression, corroborating the
earlier analysis.
The second specification includes label dummies only for PreOrder, in order for us to
test for whether investors with label Ax in that treatment are more or less likely to experience
higher investment/compliance than the average investor in None or SeqServe. Because we
are interested in behavior across all rounds of the experiment, we do not include time trends
or DNRCt−1 as regressors.
In the investment regression, we first note that because investment level was 100% for
all players with label A8 we are unable to make inference using the random effects probit
estimator. We find investment levels by investors with labels A7-A5 to be significantly higher
than average investment in None (all comparisons χ2(1) ≥ 3.44, p ≤ 0.064). Investment
levels by investors with labels A4-A2 were not significantly different than average investment
in None (all comparisons χ2(1) ≤ 1.75, p ≥ 0.185). Investors with label A1 in PreOrder
had significantly lower investment levels than the average in None (χ2(1) = 27.87, p < 0.001).
Comparing PreOrder to SeqServe, we find that investors with labels A7, A6, and A5 had
significantly higher investment than the average in SeqServe, while investment levels by
investors with label A4 were not significantly different than average investment in SeqServe
(χ2(1) = 0.09, p = 0.765); in all other cases, investment levels conditional on a label in
PreOrder were significantly lower than average investment in SeqServe (all comparisons,
χ2(1) ≥ 3.10, p ≤ 0.078).
In the compliance regression, we find compliance levels for investors with labels A8-A5 to
be significantly higher than average compliance in None (all comparisons χ2(1) ≥ 18.35, p ≤
0.001). Compliance levels for investors with labels A4-A2 were not significantly different from
the average compliance in None (all comparisons χ2(1) ≤ 2.40, p ≥ 0.121). Investors with
label A1 in PreOrder had significantly lower compliance levels than the average in None
(χ2(1) = 255.19, p < 0.001). Comparing PreOrder to SeqServe, we find that investors
with labels A8-A5 had significantly higher compliance levels than the average in SeqServe (all
comparisons, χ2(1) ≥ 26.65, p < 0.001), while compliance levels for investors with labels A4-
A2 were not significantly different from the average investment in SeqServe (all comparisons,
χ2(1) ≤ 0.1.96, p ≥ 0.162). Investors with label A1 in PreOrder had significantly lower
compliance levels than the average in SeqServe (χ2(1) = 222.62, p < 0.001).
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Instructions
Welcome to our experiment. Please do not talk to other participants in the room. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand and we will take your question in private. These instructions explain
how the experiment works. Please read them carefully. Your compensation will depend on your decisions,
as well as the decisions of other people in the room.
The payments in the experiment are in Experimental Currency Units (ECU): 1 ECU is worth £2. There
are 22 rounds, 2 for practice and 20 for compensation. After the last round, the computer will pick 3
rounds at random. We will convert your payments in those rounds into pounds and pay you in cash. You
will also receive £3 for participating in this experiment.
There are two types of players: 8 Player As and 8 Player Bs. You will be informed about your type once
the experiment starts and retain it for the entire experiment. Every Player A will be given a label: A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, and A8. Player As will be informed about their label once the experiment starts
and retain it for the entire experiment.
At the start of each round, the computer will randomly match one Player A to one Player B.
Player B is told the label of the Player A he or she is paired with in that round.
Player A must then make a decision: Stay or Enter.
If Player A chooses Stay, then both Player A and Player B get 1 ECU and the round ends.
If Player A chooses Enter, then Player B must make a decision: Send or Keep.
If Player B chooses Send, then both Player A and Player B get 2 ECU.
If Player B chooses Keep, then Player A gets 0 ECU and Player B gets 4 ECU.
This is the end of the round. Your payments do not carry over to the next round.
1






Player A gets 1 ECU
Player B gets 1 ECU
Player B Chooses
Player A gets 2 ECU
Player B gets 2 ECU
Player A gets 0 ECU










1. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Stay, so Player B had no
choice. Of the Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
2. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Send. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
3. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
4. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A3 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.




Welcome to our experiment. Please do not talk to other participants in the room. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand and we will take your question in private. These instructions explain
how the experiment works. Please read them carefully. Your compensation will depend on your decisions,
as well as the decisions of other people in the room.
The payments in the experiment are in Experimental Currency Units (ECU): 1 ECU is worth £2. There
are 22 rounds, 2 for practice and 20 for compensation. After the last round, the computer will pick 3
rounds at random. We will convert your payments in those rounds into pounds and pay you in cash. You
will also receive £3 for participating in this experiment.
There are two types of players: 8 Player As and 8 Player Bs. You will be informed about your type once
the experiment starts and retain it for the entire experiment. Every Player A will be given a label: A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, and A8. Player As will be informed about their label once the experiment starts
and retain it for the entire experiment.
At the start of each round, the computer will randomly match one Player A to one Player B.
Player B is told the label of the Player A he or she is paired with in that round.
Player A must then make a decision: Stay or Enter.
If Player A chooses Stay, then both Player A and Player B get 1 ECU and the round ends.
If Player A chooses Enter, then Player B must make a decision: Send or Keep.
If Player B chooses Send, then both Player A and Player B get 2 ECU and the round ends.
If Player B chooses Keep, then that pair is put on a list of all pairs whose Player B chose Keep.
The computer will select 1 pair from the list at random. Each pair on the list has an equal chance of
being selected by the computer.
For example, if there are 2 pairs on the list, then each of those 2 pairs is selected with probability 12 .
For all pairs Not selected, Player A gets 0 ECU and Player B gets 4 ECU.
For the Selected pair, Player A gets 2 ECU and Player B gets 1.8 ECU.







Player A gets 1 ECU
Player B gets 1 ECU
Player B Chooses
Does the random
draw pick your pair?
Player A gets 2 ECU
Player B gets 1.8 ECU
Player A gets 2 ECU
Player B gets 2 ECU
Player A gets 0 ECU












1. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Stay, so Player B had no
choice. Of the Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
2. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Send. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
3. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. If selected, what are the payments in ECU to the players? Player A: ; Player B: .
4. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A3 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .




Welcome to our experiment. Please do not talk to other participants in the room. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand and we will take your question in private. These instructions explain
how the experiment works. Please read them carefully. Your compensation will depend on your decisions,
as well as the decisions of other people in the room.
The payments in the experiment are in Experimental Currency Units (ECU): 1 ECU is worth £2. There
are 22 rounds, 2 for practice and 20 for compensation. After the last round, the computer will pick 3
rounds at random. We will convert your payments in those rounds into pounds and pay you in cash. You
will also receive £3 for participating in this experiment.
There are two types of players: 8 Player As and 8 Player Bs. You will be informed about your type once
the experiment starts and retain it for the entire experiment. Every Player A will be given a label: A1,
A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, and A8. Player As will be informed about their label once the experiment starts
and retain it for the entire experiment.
At the start of each round, the computer will randomly match one Player A to one Player B.
Player B is told the label of the Player A he or she is paired with in that round.
Player A must then make a decision: Stay or Enter.
If Player A chooses Stay, then both Player A and Player B get 1 ECU and the round ends.
If Player A chooses Enter, then Player B must make a decision: Send or Keep.
If Player B chooses Send, then both Player A and Player B get 2 ECU and the round ends.
If Player B chooses Keep, then that pair is put on a list of all pairs whose Player B chose Keep.
The computer will select 1 pair from the list. It will sort all pairs on the list based on the label assigned
to Player A and select the pair that has the Player A with the highest label.
For example, if there are two pairs on the list and the Player As in these pairs have labels A3 and A6,
then the computer selects the pair whose Player A has the label A6.
For all pairs Not selected, Player A gets 0 ECU and Player B gets 4 ECU.
For the Selected pair, Player A gets 2 ECU and Player B gets 1.8 ECU.







Player A gets 1 ECU
Player B gets 1 ECU
Player B Chooses
Does your pair have
the highest label?
Player A gets 2 ECU
Player B gets 1.8 ECU
Player A gets 2 ECU
Player B gets 2 ECU
Player A gets 0 ECU












1. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Stay, so Player B had no
choice. Of the Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
2. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Send. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
3. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A6 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
4. Suppose you are one of the players in a pair, in which Player A3 chose Enter and Player B chose
Keep. Of the other Player Bs who had a choice, those paired with Players A1, A4, and A5 chose Keep.
1. Will your pair be put on the list? Yes or No? .
2. If you answered “Yes” to the first question, what is the chance your pair is selected? .
3. What are the payments in ECU to the two players in your pair? Player A: ; Player B: .
2
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